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ABSTRACT 
A PROGRESSIVE MIND: LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE ORIGINS OF FREE 
SPEECH 
Elizabeth Diane Todd 
May 11,2013 
This study argues that Associate Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis played 
a key role in shaping the jurisprudence of free political speech in the United States. 
Brandeis's judicial opinions on three freedom of speech cases in the post-World War I 
era provide the evidence for this argument. This thesis demonstrates how the Espionage 
and Sedition Acts of World War I allowed Brandeis the opportunity to reflect and rule on 
the Founding Fathers' meaning of free speech in a political democracy. 
Chapter I offers a detailed historiography of the Progressive Era and World War I. 
Chapter II provides a biography of Louis D. Brandeis and a historiography of civil 
liberties during World War I. Chapter III analyzes Associate Justices Holmes and 
Brandeis's shifting opinions on free speech in the 1919 cases of Schenck v. United States 
and Abrams v. United States. Chapter IV breaks down Brandeis's dissenting opinion in 
Gilbert v. Minnesota (1920). Chapter V examines Brandeis's solidified stance on free 
speech in the case of Whitney v. California (1927). In conclusion, this study finds that 
Brandeis's opinions created the language and support to apply the federal First 
Amendment to the states and to apply the "imminent threat" standard to free political 
speech cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
SETTING THE STAGE 
In the twenty-first century, scholars consider the First Amendment to define the 
fundamental rights of American citizens. Americans use their political freedom of 
speech on a daily basis through public protest, speeches, and strikes, and the distribution 
of their beliefs via papers and/or internet media. Yet, Americans have not always 
defended the freedom of speech of the First Amendment in such a manner. In 1791, the 
states ratified the Bill of Rights and constituted that "the people" was not nearly as 
expansive as it is today. Furthermore, the federal Bill of Rights only applied to the 
federal United States Constitution, leaving individual rights to be controlled by the state 
constitutions and their separate local customs and traditions. It would not be until 1925, 
in Gitlow v. New York, that the concept of incorporation applied the freedom of speech in 
the federal Bill of Rights against the states. 1 And even then it was a gradual process in 
which separate decisions by the United States Supreme Court applied each right from the 
Bill of Rights to the states under the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
in a process known as "selective incorporation.',2 Rights have evolved over the past 
century to encompass all American citizens in all states. This thesis argues that Associate 
Justice Louis Brandeis of the United States Supreme Court played a significant role in 
shaping the eventual jurisprudence of the freedom of speech in the United States through 
1 Citlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
2 Paul L. Murphy, Liberty and Justice: A Historical Record of American Constitutional 
Development (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958),302-303. 
his judicial opinions in the post-World War I cases, Abrams et al. v. United States (1919), 
Gilbert v. State of Minnesota (1920), and Whitney v. California (1927).3 
Starting in 1914 with the outbreak of war in Europe, President Woodrow Wilson 
began his preparatory work for a united American front in case the United States entered 
the war. Traveling the nation, President Wilson gave numerous speeches that warned of 
aliens and hyphenates in the United States. Wilson referred to aliens as any non-United 
States citizens living in the United States and he identified hyphenates as any American 
citizens who were identified by their country of origin, for example German-Americans. 
He argued that if the United States entered the war, these individuals would side with 
their countries of origin and cause an internal security threat to the United States. He 
directed his conspiracy theory at German-Americans, Socialists, Irish-Americans and 
other groups that he deemed to be "radicals.,,4 In one speech to the Daughters of the 
American Revolution in 1915 he exclaimed, "I am in a hurry to have a line-up, and let the 
men who are thinking first of other countries stand on one side, and all those that are for 
America first, last and all the time, on the other side. ,,5 
In 1916, President Wilson proposed legislation to Congress restricting freedom of 
speech and press. While not enacted then, the bill rested in Congress until 1917 when the 
United States entered the war. At that point, Wilson's threat of internal dissent was so 
ingrained in the minds of Americans that Congress passed the Espionage Act of 1917 
3 Abrams et al. v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Gilbert v. State of Minnesota, 254 
U.S. 325 (1920); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
4 Ibid., 53. See also, John Milton Cooper, Woodrow Wilson: A Biography (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2009). 
5 Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, The New Democracy: Presidential 
Messages, Addresses, and Other Papers (New York: Harper, 1962),3:377. 
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with broad public support. As historian Paul Murphy explained in World War I and the 
Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States: 
Wilson's pre-entry attitudes and behavior were carried to their logical extreme 
when war came. The president was a man who could tolerate little criticism of 
himself or his policies at any time. Anticipating the necessity for coercing total 
national unity if a national emergency occurred, he began eliminating criticism by 
screening out people whom he was convinced the majority of Americans would 
feel had no business expressing strong, controversial views on the proper course 
for the nation. 6 
The preparatory work of Wilson's administration created what they hoped to be 100 
percent American support and effort for the war. Indeed, the majority of the American 
public supported Wilson's effort for the war, yet, loyal Americans, who were ostracized 
by Wilson's discriminatory standards, strongly disapproved of Wilson's plan, including 
many German-Americans. 
In April 1917 the United States entered World War I. However, by that time, the 
Great War in Europe was in full. swing. It started in August 1914 with the assassination 
of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria. Due to a complex alliance system that had formed 
across Europe, the assassination sparked a war between the Triple Alliance, which 
consisted of Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany and the Triple Entente, which 
consisted of France, the United Kingdom, and Russia. European leaders had established 
these political and military alliances at the end of the nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century and these alliances constituted a delicate balance of power in Europe. 
The United States called for a non-intervention policy to begin the war because President 
Wilson and Congress wanted to maintain neutrality. In fact, President Wilson threw his 
support behind pacifist groups in the pre-war period in order to gain support for his non-
6 Murphy, World War J, 55. 
3 
intervention policy. Later pacifist groups felt betrayed by Wilson's entrance into the war 
and subsequent accusation of pacifists as a domestic threat. 
In January 1917, American intelligence discovered a telegram that had been sent 
to the Mexican authorities. The American decoders determined the author of the 
telegraph to be the German Foreign Minister, Arthur Zimmermann. Many contemporary 
scholars believe that the telegraph was sent by the British in order to entice the 
Americans to join the Triple Entente. Regardless, the telegram made the claim that the 
German forces were going to evoke submarine warfare on United States submarines. In 
response to the telegram and the sinking of seven United States submarine ships, 
President Wilson and Congress declared war on Germany on April 6, 1917.7 
The number of battlefronts in Europe and the usage of trench warfare required 
thousands of United States soldiers to be sent overseas. In tum, the demand for soldiers 
affected many aspects on the home front in the United States. World War I became a 
total war for the United States, in which the federal government called on all citizens to 
help in the war effort. Regardless of age, gender, and race, the United States invoked all 
American citizens to assist in the feeding, clothing, and arming of the troops. Further, the 
high death rates of the war led to the United States government enacting a conscription 
measure in which young men were required to fight in the war if drafted. Some 
Americans disagreed with these wartime policies. To deal with these nonconformists in a 
swift manner, the federal government enacted the Espionage Act of 1917. According to 
legal historian Kermit Hall, the Espionage Act included two key censorship provisions: 
First, the act made it a felony to attempt to cause insubordination in the armed 
forces, to interfere with the operation of the draft, and to convey false statements 
7 Ibid., 51-56. 
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about the military with the intent of disrupting their operations. Second, the act 
permitted the postmaster to ban treasonable or seditious material from the mail. 8 
President Wilson had proposed this Act in 1916 and with the outbreak of war in 1917, 
Congress enacted it. Wilson's administration felt that the Espionage Act would curb 
dissent on the home front and allow the government to focus on the war abroad. 
However, the disgruntled pacifists and other radical leaders continued to speak out in 
disapproval of the United States foreign politics. Therefore, in 1918, Congress passed an 
amendment to the Espionage Act called the Sedition Act, which made it a felony to 
"disrupt or discourage recruiting or enlistment service, or utter, print, or publish disloyal, 
profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government.,,9 In doing so, the 
government gave power to the Attorney General to arrest radicals who spoke out against 
the government. Again, most public opinion supported this measure because Americans 
feared an internal security threat. 
In addition, in 1917, President Wilson created the Committee on Public 
Information, headed by George Creel, to enforce the wartime policies through a 
propaganda campaign. The campaign called on Americans to support the war effort and 
identify those citizens who opposed or spoke out against American involvement in World 
War I. The main job of the committee was censorship. Wilson wanted his war policies 
propagandized to the American people. He distrusted reporters and thus, put his own 
I · h f d' .. 10 peop e m c arge 0 news IssemmatlOn. 
8 Hall, The A1agic Mirror, 271 ; E!>pionage Act of 1917, Public Lavv 65-24, Us. Statutes 
at Large 217 (1917). 
9 Sedition Act of 1918, Public Law 65-150, U.S'. Statutes at Large 553 (1918). 
10 Murphy, World War 1, 75; See aiso Stephen Vauglm, Holding Fast the Inner Lines: 
Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public Information (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Pres~, 1980). 
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World War I and President Wilson's wartime policies shaped the setting for the 
political freedom of speech cases in this study. While not all three cases developed 
directly from wartime events, it was during the American involvement in World War I 
that a narrow national consciousness of civil liberties began to foment. Louis D. 
Brandeis was among the limited group of people who began to see problems with the 
interpretation of free political speech in the First Amendment. However, before jumping 
into Brandeis's role in shaping the eventual jurisprudence of the freedom of speech, one 
must understand the historical context of America at the tum of the twentieth century in 




THE COMPLEX BACKDROP OF THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND WORLD WAR I 
The turn of the twentieth century is a difficult period to understand in United 
States history because of the complex nature of the nation transitioning into modernity. 
From the post-Reconstruction age through World War I, Americans experienced changes 
in all realms of life, including society, politics, and economics. The United States went 
from having a decentralized government, agriculture-based economy, rural living 
communities, and a divided class system to having a strong federal government, 
industrial-based economy, large urban communities, and a newly formed middle-class. 
The rapid development of America from the 1890s to the early 1920s explains why 
historians often refer to the period as the Progressive Era. Although it should be noted 
that "progressive" is a complex and ambiguous term. During World War I, Europeans 
and other foreign peoples began to view the United States as an international power. In 
addition, Americans started to develop a sense of nationalism and a distaste for un-
American behavior. Understanding this time period in American history is essential to 
understanding contemporary America. 
However, as with any time of great change, conflict and disagreement exist. In 
the same way, historians encounter conflict and disagreement on how the period should 
be studied and interpreted. This chapter presents the different historical approaches of 
historians writing from the second half of the twentieth century to the present. The 
publication parameters of this segment have been selected to consolidate the field of 
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writing and offer more recent arguments. This historiography is far from complete, but 
endeavors to incorporate many of the classic works in the field, while also addressing the 
recent literature. The important concept to take away from this historical context is that 
the Progressive and World War I era was complicated, so much so that historians are still 
grappling with the conceptual issues even today. Similarly, the Supreme Court cases on 
the freedom of speech in the post World War I years proved complicated as well in the 
wake of this age of reform. This chapter establishes the historical setting for the three 
Supreme Court cases in this study. Furthermore. it provides the American backdrop for 
Louis D. Brandeis's life and career on the Supreme Court. 
The Historiography of the Progressive Era and World War I 
Richard Hofstadter was an American historian who taught at Columbia University 
and received the Pulitzer Prize twice for his publications. Published in 1955, The Age of 
Reform, was one of his classic works that received such an honor. Though he died in 
1970, his work on the late nineteenth and early twentieth century continues to influence 
the way that scholars understand the period. Hofstadter argued that the Populists of the 
1890s and the Progressives of the early 1900s held up such unobtainable ideological 
standards that it was impossible for them to be successful. I The Populists idealized the 
"agrarian myth," which emphasized an economic return to the hardworking and moral 
yeoman farmer, instead of the commercialized business industry. The Progressives 
idealized the "industrial myth," which emphasized a community without immigrants or 
big businesses where government enforced middle class authority. Hofstadter contended 
I Richard, Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Vintage Books, 1955). 
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that the fear of losing social status drove the reform movements of the farmers of the 
Populist Party and the middle-class citizens of the Progressive Party. These ideologies 
formed the basis of Hofstadter' s book, which offered a new approach to understanding 
the widely studied "age of reform." 
Hofstadter's book covered the years from 1890 to 1940 and he divided his 
examination into sections on the Populists, the Progressives, and the New Deal, with an 
emphasis on the first two eras. His examination of the Populist Party described the 
agrarian myth fully, emphasizing the party's desire to tum away from urbanization and 
return to the agricultural community that the Founding Fathers and Thomas Jefferson 
established at the start of the new nation. The Populists called for a restoration of the 
pastoral past. They found support from farmers and small businessmen who suffered 
under the railroad and bank chiefs. However, Hofstadter explained how this call for 
reform was impossible to obtain due to the fact that big businesses, improvement in 
farming techniques, and the commercialization of farming were irreversible shifts 
necessary to feeding the masses and maintaining efficiency. Even the yeoman farmers 
who were idealized did not reap the economic benefits of small farming and often found 
commercial farming to be their best option. Urbanizing America forced farmers to shift 
from local farming to regional farn1ing, and beyond. 
Urban, middle-class citizens comprised the Progressive Party and they felt that 
immigrant workers on one side and political machines on the other side squeezed them 
out of the political process. Through muckraking journalism, the Progressives exposed 
corruption and lawbreaking by these two groups and called for a return of government to 
the people. However, two factors restrained the Progressives: disorganization and war. 
9 
Besides the common call for government intervention, the Progressives differed on 
approach and structure, spreading their movement too thin. Furthermore, with the 
outbreak of war in Europe in 1914, the Progressives lost a lot of their liberal support for 
reform because wartime evoked a conservative stance out of the majority of the 
population. Therefore, for Hofstadter, the Progressives momentum dissipated in the war 
years and it did not pick back up in the post-war years. 
Hofstadter offered an interesting new approach to studying the tum of the 
twentieth century; however, many flaws existed in his argument. To start, his description 
of the Populist Party as anti -Semitic does not take into account the historical context of 
the era. Anti-Semitism was a common perspective of people in the 1890s, and many of 
the Populists were not anti-Semitic. By lumping the beliefs of thousands into one strict 
description he lost sight of the disparitie') withil1 the Populist Party. Secondly, 
Hofstadter's fOCLlS on the myths of Populist and Progressive parties as their ultimate 
breakdown, failed to consider the gravity of other factors, such as disorganization and 
war. Though he mentioned these factors, he did not regard them as major influences. 
Many historians argue that these two parties proved unsuccessful due to their third party 
status in United States politics, making them not powerful enough to fund or organize 
mass followings. Furthermore, wartime played a huge role, both in the Spanish-
American War of 1898 and World War I, in putting a freeze on reform movements for 
the sake of unifying against the enemy. Hofstadter's argument needed a wider 
10 
examination of the factors involved in the breakdown of the Populist and Progressive 
movements.2 
In 1963, Arthur S. Link followed Hofstadter's political approach with his work, 
Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917. While teaching at Northwestern 
and Princeton University, Link devoted his career to the study of Woodrow Wilson and 
the politics and diplomacy of the period from 1910-1920. Link wrote this work as part of 
the American Nation series, which is rewritten every fifty years or so to create a 
comprehensive American history for scholars and the general public. As the scholarly 
authority on Woodrow Wilson, the American Nation editors placed Link in charge of the 
period of Wilson's political life prior to World War I. In his book, Link argues that 
Wilson was less of a Progressive and idealist than people acknowledge him as for his 
work in his second term. 3 
Starting with the election of 1912 between Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard 
Taft, Eugene Debs and Woodrow Wilson, Link contends that Roosevelt's New 
Nationalism platform was the most progressive of the men running for presidential office. 
Link explains that Wilson's New Freedom platform called for much more moderate 
reforms. He argues that Wilson's economic reforms drew from Louis Brandeis's 
concepts of the "curse of big business." Once in office, Link described Wilson's first 
term reforms as weak. For example, while he worked to lower tarifflaws, he supported 
2 For another look at the 1950s political approach see Samuel P. Hays's Conservation 
and The Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959) which assesses at the conservation 
movements at the tum of the twentieth century and the various groups, elites and 
grassroots individuals, who conflicted in their political approaches to environmental 
solutions. 
3 Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York: 
Harper & Row Publishers, 1963). 
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the passing of the Sixteenth Amendment, the income tax. Moreover, Wilson did not 
support child labor laws, women's suffrage or immigration. He also enforced segregation 
within the government and society. Even with the start of the European conflict in 1914, 
Link demonstrates how Wilson took the middle road, offering trade with both Germany 
and the Allies. Link presents Wilson as a stubborn man who did not intend for such 
social and political reforms. Ironically, however, in 1916, Wilson campaigned on the 
basis of keeping America out ofthe war and for continued progressivism. Also in 1916, 
he put Louis Brandeis, a Jew, on the Supreme Court and initiated talks for child labor 
laws. Link makes it clear that Wilson's first and second terms differed widely. In his 
first term, he was not the reformer that people remember him as today. Link claims that 
Wilson's unexpected foreign affairs issues forced him to become a reformer in his second 
term as President. 4 
While maintaining a partially political approach, Robert H. Wiebe, former 
professor at Northwestern University, shifted the historiography of this period by 
introducing social history to the mix. His 1967 work, The Search(or Order, 1877-1920, 
presents the idea of the "new middle class," which he argues developed in this time 
period and made up the group of people responsible for the progressive reforms that 
brought America into the modem era. 5 Wiebe studied the shift in American values from 
4In 1963, Gabriel Kolko published his work The Triumph a/Conservatism: A 
Reinterpretation 0/ American History, 1900-1916 (Chicago: The Free Press of Glencoe, 
1963), in which he argued contrary to the belief that progressivism was a middle class 
reaction against big business and he also argued contrary to the belief that the federal 
government sought to destroy big business. He focuses on the political and economic 
realms of the period to draw conclusions. 
5 Robert H. Wiebe, The Search/or Order 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967). 
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the small island communities to the growing urbanized nation. He claims that railroads 
connected the once isolated towns and shifted the economy to a more integrated one. 
By expanding the economy and means of travel, more people sought training and 
education in professions. Wiebe identifies the middle class as the group of individuals 
that worked to obtain expertise in various professions for economic and social gains. For 
example, standardization in instruction for medicine, law and business occurred. In tum, 
Wiebe argues that this training instilled in the middle class a desire to reform the 
government into an organized, managerial. bureaucratic and efficient institution. The 
middle class called for public health initiatives, tax assessments. secret ballots, an end to 
corruption by bosses, railroad regulation and many other refornls in the early 1900s, 
especially in regard to government control. 
Wiebe is one of the first historians to try and understand American values at the 
tum of the century. However, his view of the progressives is too narrow. He limits the 
progressive reforms to the middle class, claiming that they alone elicited change. While 
much of the reform movement may have come from the professional middle class, one 
economic class cannot define the progressives. Social and cultural elites, such as the 
Vanderbilts and Roosevelts, had a role in the progressive movement, as did working class 
laborers. Nonetheless, Wiebe's work is a classic because of his analysis of the shift from 
the island communities to the urban communities. Wiebe goes beyond the political to the 
social realm, giving readers greater insight into the societal changes and problems of the 
time. 
Over a decade later in 1980, David M. Kennedy dove deeper into the social 
sphere with his work, Over Here: The First World War and American Society. As a 
13 
professor at Stanford University, Kennedy utilized economics, culture, society and 
politics to analyze the history of early twentieth century America. In this particular book, 
he examines America's home front from April 2, 1917 to November 11, 1918. He argues 
that the way Americans mobilized, chose to fight, and then went about winning the war 
explains a great deal about the enduring American character.6 His work centers on 
America shifting from an isolationist nation to an international power. He contends that 
this transformation led to a more centralized American government and a more divided 
American populace. 
Prior to World War I, Kennedy demonstrates how the Progressives, such as 
Theodore Roosevelt, balanced self-government and efficient government. Yet with war, 
people demanded greater federal government control and greater efficiency. However, 
not all Americans agreed on how governments should be run and in effect, many 
divisions erupt among varying social and political groups, including socialists and 
democrats. In addition, Kennedy argues that the war exposed the inefficiency and 
organization of the American economy. Once again, American people divided on how to 
handle the economic issues, such as raising money for the war effort. Beyond politics 
and economics, Americans argued over military strategy and civil liberties. In the end, 
Kennedy contends that the majority of Americans were disappointed with the results of 
the war. 
Kennedy draws largely from Wiebe's concept of the breakdown of the island 
communities and the rising new world of internationalism. He provides a great deal of 
content on the American home front during World War I, demonstrating the societal 
6 David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1980). 
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conflicts that come with any war period. However, his argument that the majority of 
people were disappointed with the afternlath of war is overstated. In fact, it was 
intellectual minorities who were most disappointed, such as women's suffrage leaders 
and Woodrow Wilson. The majonty of people were quite pleased with America's victory 
at war and economic prosperity from the war industries as is evidenced by the lack of 
umest in the United States in the post-war months. Moreover, most Americans called for 
greater federal government regulation, especially of aliens and radicals, who posed a 
threat to the American nation. By the end of World War I, Americans had just started to 
develop notions of a civil liberties consciousness. Thus, Kennedy would do well to 
specify his argument to the intellectual minorities who did not support the growth of the 
federal government and the suppression of dissenters. 
In 1981, a year after Kennedy's social analysis, T.J. Jackson Lears introduced an 
entirely new approach to studying the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: 
psychohistory. His work, No Place ~fGrace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of 
American Culture, 1880-1920, was an intellectual and cultural history that opened the 
historical field to new and interesting debates. As a professor at Rutgers University, 
Lears used sermons, diaries, letters, novels, poems and essays to argue that elites at the 
end of the nineteenth century sought antimodernism to regain their cultural authority in 
opposition to the growth of the middle class and progressive reform movement.7 Lears 
contends that elites were not simply nostalgic for previous wealth and power; in fact, they 
searched for a way to accommodate and find "realness" within modernization. Lears 
7 T.J. Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of 
American Culture. 1880-1920 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981). 
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explains that elites faced the problem of "weightlessness" and disassociation during this 
period of change. 
Lears's approach is intellectualized drawing on the artistic concept of 
impressionism and psychological theory of child escapism to explain how elites dealt 
with industrial technology, bureaucratic organization, and systematic clockwork. He 
analyzes the pill-popping trend of elites during the period, in which they would take 
opium, cocaine or morphine for comfort and he also addresses the neurasthenia epidemic, 
in which wealthy citizens would develop nervous symptoms, such as the inability to 
speak or move. He explains that elites turned to an arts and craft ideology in an attempt 
to return to Wiebe's island communities with the idealization of manual labor and a 
return to the soil. Further, elites took vacations and therapies to escape the transitional 
period. 
Lears presents a unique and fascinating window into the lives of elites at the tum 
of the twentieth century. However, his argument that the elites searched for something 
more "real" is strained. Doing drugs and having nervous breakdowns does not 
necessarily mean that all elites struggled to cope with modernity. Many may have been 
or were probably bored and/or addicted. As an elite himself and married to an artist, 
Jackson Lears incorporates too much personal entitlement into his argument. He fails to 
define antimodernism, which presents many problems to his argument and he tends to 
sympathize with the elites. Regardless, his work is a contribution to the historiography 
because it offers a psychological and intellectual approach to the largely political and 
social field of study. His work raises questions that may have gone unnoticed had it not 
been for his research efforts. 
16 
In 1983, John Milton Cooper Jr., who teaches at the University of Wisconsin, 
returned to the political historical approach with elements of philosophy. His work, The 
Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt, is a comparative 
biography of two early twentieth century American presidents: Woodrow Wilson and 
Theodore Roosevelt. The goal of his book is to demonstrate the effects that the two men 
had on each other and on the modernization of American politics. By tracing both of 
their lives from childhood to death, Cooper compares their backgrounds, characters, and 
political aims. 8 
Cooper draws the underlying theme to this work from the nineteenth century, 
German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche's concept of the warrior and the priest. 
According to his philosophical model, the warrior is a man of honor who goes beyond 
self-interest for the common good. Conversely, the priest is a devious man of weak 
character who seeks self-interests through cunning and conniving. Cooper assigns 
Wilson as the warrior and Roosevelt as the priest in his title. He then develops these 
ideas in his book depicting the lives of these men to explain why he so labeled them. 
Through an analysis of their domestic and foreign policies, Cooper argues that Wilson 
was a realist who had a clear agenda and an analytical and academic approach. On the 
other hand, Cooper argues that Roosevelt portrayed an image of rugged individualism, 
focusing more on his public dramatization and idealistic reforms than the every day needs 
of the American people. 
8 John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and The Priest: rVoodrow Wilson and Theodore 
Roosevelt (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1983). 
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Starting with their childhoods, Cooper found similarities in their family 
backgrounds. Both men came from comfortable means with a strong sense of patriarchy. 
Roosevelt was born into great wealth and materialism, though he suffered from asthma 
and digestive problems. Wilson was born into a Presbyterian ministerial family and 
suffered from dyslexia. Cooper contends that although both men faced personal 
limitations, they both overcame their limitations with determination. Roosevelt took up 
sports and military activism and Wilson practiced memorization techniques and became 
an avid reader and writer. They both attended prestigious universities where they 
pursued further education in American politics. However, it was Roosevelt's family 
name that allowed him to transition into the political world; whereas, Wilson had to take 
a detour through academics to earn his name in politics. 
In 1902, Roosevelt became President of the United States with the death of 
President William McKinley. In the same year Wilson became President of Princeton 
University. Interestingly, Cooper explains that the men were acquainted and held a 
mutual respect for the other. They both achieved successes in their leadership roles; but, 
by 1908, Roosevelt had renounced a second term and the Board of Trustees was pushing 
Wilson toward resignation for his radical reforms to the undergraduate curriculum and 
residence areas. Once again both men overcame these downturns in their careers and, by 
1912, faced off in the presidential campaign. 
With Taft winning the incumbent nomination from the Republican Party, 
Roosevelt started the Progressive Party, running on a theme of New Nationalism. He 
preached an idealistic vision of nationalism, but lacked a war for such patriotism. 
Spending his entire life overcompensating for the fact that his father did not serve in the 
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Civil War, Roosevelt went out of his way to fight in the War of 1898 and presented an 
imperialistic and militaristic foreign and domestic policy. Wilson was the nominee of the 
Democratic Party and he ran on the theme of New Freedom, on which he presented the 
realistic vision of reform through the interests of the majority. Wilson renounced 
imperialism and took a nonintervention approach to foreign affairs. Though sharing 
similarities in their anti-machine and government intervention policies, the men attacked 
each other and played off the other's mistakes. 
Once in office, Wilson instituted his domestic and foreign policies with the 
constant criticism of Roosevelt and his followers. Roosevelt continued to find his way 
into the public spotlight, including going to the White House and asking to lead a 
volunteer troop on the Western Front. Roosevelt was emotional and overbearing. 
Conversely, Wilson showed steadfastness in regards to the war and fought for 
nonintervention, but preparedness until 1917 when the foreign threat forced the United 
States to enter the war. Even so, Wilson fought on the grounds that winning the war 
would make the world more peaceful. Wilson maintained this perspective through the 
peace talks in Paris where he introduced his conception of the League of Nations. 
Shortly after the war's end, both men died, leaving behind great and troubled 
legacies. As Cooper contends, "Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson still stand as 
the principal architects of modern American politics.,,9 Cooper's work is a classic in the 
historiography of early twentieth century politics. Understanding the backgrounds, 
characters, and policies of Roosevelt and Wilson explains the basis for modern American 
politics. Presenting Wilson as the clear-headed "warrior" and Roosevelt as the selfish 
9 Ibid., 361. 
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"priest," Cooper takes a new and convincing approach to comprehending the lives of 
these two influential men. 
Also following the return to the political methodology, in 1985 Robert Ferrell 
published Woodrow Wilson and World War 1, 1917-1921. Ferrell received his Ph.D. 
from Yale University and taught at Indiana University Bloomington. In addition, he 
served in the Air Force in World War II and worked as an intelligence agent in the 
Korean War. His work is a clear product of his academic and military background. 
Written as a part of the New American Nation Series, Ferrell's book picks up the story of 
Woodrow Wilson in 1917 where historian Arthur Link left off with his 1963 work, 
Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era. Ferrell's historical focus is the use of 
presidential power, which can be seen in his various publications on Harry S. Truman, 
Calvin Coolidge, Woodrow Wilson, Warren G. Harding, and Dwight Eisenhower. For 
his research on Wilson during and after the Great War, he used the archives of four 
countries, manuscript collections, oral historie~, unpublished reminiscences of some of 
the military participants in the war, diaries and letters of soldiers, and Woodrow Wilson's 
papers. From his study of these materials and the use of secondary sources, Ferrell 
concludes that Wilson succeeded in his decision to go to war and his leadership during 
the war, but he failed with his peace negotiations in the post-war years because of 
personal illness and his inability to delegate. 10 Ferrell presents a clear picture of Wilson's 
administration during the war, though his nationalistic and militaristic opinions 
sometimes deflated his arguments and left room for criticism. 
10 Robert H. Ferrell, Woodrow TVi/son and World TYar l, J917-J921 (New York: Harper 
& Row, Publishers, 1985). 
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Aiming his book at an undergraduate and general audience, Ferrell follows 
chronological order with close attention to detail. He starts his narrative in April 1917 
when President Wilson went to the Capitol to ask for war. Building from that point, 
Ferrell spends the next eight chapters on the militaristic, diplomatic, and political 
developments taking place during the war. Ferrell exposes his nationalistic perspective 
when he declares, "It is not too much to say that the creation of a great American fighting 
army, the American Expeditionary Forces, was the most decisive act by any nation in the 
war, the single act that determined the defeat of Imperial Germany in November 1918." II 
Ferrell leaves no room for the variety of factors that also likely played a role in the defeat 
of Germany including the conflict of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the internal 
collapse of the German state. He argues that Wilson was a Progressive at war, leading 
the nation to victory. 
Nonetheless where Ferrell exaggerates on America's military prowess, he does an 
excellent job of identifying the issues of America fighting in its first large-scale, overseas 
war, naming logistics as the biggest problem. He breaks down Wilson's cabinet to see 
who was and who was not an "ignoramus" in the business of war. 12 He praises Wilson 
for using a "no politics" stance when naming heads of various departments, once again 
describing Wilson as a Progressive in his appointing of competent experts to his cabinet. 
Although the United States Army, Navy and Air Force struggled to organize and obtain 
the proper amount of food and armaments, Wilson found intelligent leaders to tackle 
these problems, including General Peyton C. March as Chief of Staff and Herbert Hoover 
as food administrator. 
II Ibid., 15. 
12 Ibid., 117. 
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In the last portion of his book, Ferrell connects Wilson's failure in the post-war 
period to his recurrent illnesses and stubbornness. In his poor health condition, Ferrell 
criticizes Wilson for going to Paris for the peace talks and traveling throughout the 
United States to campaign for the League of Nations. Ferrell identifies hubris as the 
reason behind Wilson's need to do everything himself. Ferrell also links this lack of 
delegation to Wilson's stroke in 1919 that "turned him into a shell of a man, incompetent 
to occupy the office of President." 13 Ferrell supports this argument by examining how 
Wilson had to be shut away from the media to recover and how his wife took over his 
presidential duties. Then, Ferrell makes a bold statement claiming, "He [Wilson] should 
have resigned immediately in favor of Vice President Thomas R. Marshall. Instead he 
clung to the presidency for nearly a year and a half, October 2, 1919, to March 4, 
1921.,,14 Such an opinion is irrelevant and unjustified, considering Wilson did not retire 
and remained president until the end of his term. 
Furthermore, Ferrell flip-flops on blaming Wilson's illness or stubbornness for 
various issues. For example, Ferrell argues that Wilson's illness made him unable to 
control the Committee on Public Information (CPI) during and after the war, but Ferrell 
blames Wilson's stubbornness for the failure of post-war peace talks in Paris. If Wilson 
was coherent enough for the post-war peace talks, he was well aware of what was going 
on with the CPI and civil liberties during the war. It is likely that a combination of hubris 
and poor health played a role in the majority of Wilson's politics near the end of his term, 
but it is unfair to erase him from his role in the 100 percent Americanism that placed 
many aliens and immigrant Americans in jail. 
13 Ibid., 156. 
14 Ibid. 
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In 1986, Christine Lunardini expanded on the cultural historical approach of 
Kennedy and Lears with her work From Eql-tal Suffrage to Equal Rights: Alice Paul and 
the National Woman's Party, 1910-1928. Receiving her Ph.D. from Princeton 
University, Lunardini studied under Arthur S. Link and thus, while she focuses on a 
component of American culture, she set it within the boundaries of politics. She argues 
that the work of Alice Paul and the National Women's Party was largely, if not entirely 
responsible for the passing of the Nineteenth Amendment, women's suffrage. IS 
Lunardini's book takes a chronological amI detailed look at Alice Paul and her 
struggle to organize for women's suffrage. Starting with a brief biography of Paul's 
personal life and education, Lunardini explains how Paul became a charismatic leader 
and motivator. In 1913, a new generation of women developed who had higher education 
and urban, industrial and technological understanding. These new suffragists were more 
career-oriented and less apt to marry. As Lunardini explicates, women of this group 
questioned old assumptions and found inspiration in the British suffragists. Among this 
group of women was Alice Paul who obtained two law degrees, a Ph.D., and never 
married. Joining with the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), 
these new suffragists felt dissatisfied. Indeed they desired to use militant tactics and 
argue for women's suffrage at the federal level. With the leadership of Paul, this group 
split from the NAWSA and eventually formed the political party, the National Woman's 
Party (NWP). 
U sing methods such as picket protests and organized marches, Paul and the NWP 
faced conflicts with NA WSA who promoted peaceful talks at the state level and the 
15 Christine Lunardini, From Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights: Alice Paul and the National 
Woman's Party, 1910-1928 (New York: toExcel Press. 1986). 
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Democratic Party who did not support women's suffrage. Throughout World War I Paul 
and the NWP continued to raise money and protest outside the White House, facing arrest 
and physical harassment. Eventually, Wilson joined their cause and by 1920 the 
Nineteenth Amendment had finally passed. In her last chapter Lunardini explains the 
slow disbanding of the NWP and the difficulty of Paul to gather support for a new cause: 
the Equal Rights Amendment. 
Lunardini's work offers insight into the women's movement during the 
Progressive Era and World War I. It is a cultural approach that focuses on a minority 
group of women. One critique of the book is that Lunardini is a feminist. While 
women's suffrage is a remarkable achievement, Lunardini is close-minded as to who 
worked to accomplish that great feat. She gives almost sole credit to Alice Paul and the 
National Woman's Party. It would benefit the credibility of the book, if Lunardini did 
not show such cheerleading of Paul and the NWP. Their efforts should be celebrated 
alongside the work of others, such as the NA WSA, who also aided in the movement. 16 
16 In 1986, James T. Kloppenberg published Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and 
Progressivism in European and American Thought. 1870-1920 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), in which he utilizes a cultural and intellectual approach, similar 
to Jackson Lears's, to compare the uncertain ideas about politics of Europeans and 
Americans. In 1992, Theda Skocpol published Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The 
Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1992), in which she argues that the United States developed welfare 
programs for soldiers and their dependents and mothers and their children much earlier 
than the welfare programs of the New Deal. She claims that following the Civil War 
these welfare programs were implemented and lasted throughout the World War I period. 
As a political scientist she takes a different approach than typical historians, though she 
still offers solid historical scholarship on the time period. In 2003 Michael McGerr 
published A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in 
America, 1870-1920 (New York: Free Press, 2003), in which he argues that 
progressivism created many of the current political problems of modern times because 
the "the creed of a crusading middle class, offered the promise of utopianism-and 
generated the inevitable letdown of unrealistic expectations." McGerr claims that such 
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Shifting to the most recent literature in the historiography of this period, in 2006 
David Traxel, professor at the University of the Sciences at Philadelphia, published 
Crusader Nation: the United States in Peace and the Great War, 1898-1920, which 
draws on a combination of the political, cultural and social histories of the 1960s, 1970s, 
and 1980s. It is an overview book that demonstrates how the people of the Progressive 
Era truly believed in what they advocated for and expected change to happen. 
Ultimately, Traxel argues that World War I was both the culmination and defeat of 
progressivism. 17 Moving chronologically, Traxel works his way from the Roosevelt's 
term through the passage of Prohibition and women's suffrage. 
Traxel offers great biographical information on Roosevelt and Wilson who served 
during this period, allowing the reader to gain a sense of how they became progressive 
leaders. He also describes the reforms that they worked on during their individual 
presidential terms. In addition, Traxel presents detailed biographical information on 
nonpolitical reformers, such as Jane Addams, Mary Mother Jones and Henry Ford. 
Traxel utilizes a narrative history approach in which he provides historical context while 
using anecdotes and storytelling methods throughout the work. He incorporates cultural 
changes by addressing the introduction of ragtime music, new art forms and Edison's 
inventions, such as the phonograph, Socially he demonstrates reforms that crossed class 
lines, including labor strikes and birth-control promotions. Traxel touched on all of these 
---------<-------------
ambitious reforms led to eventual disappointment in the post-World War I period and 
American people would never jump onboard such idealistic reforms ever again. 
17 David Traxel, Crusader Nation: The United States in Peace and the Great War, 1898-
1920 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf: 2006). Traxel's book seems to draw largely from the 
work of Michael McGerr in the argument that Worid War I marked the climax and 
downfall of the progressiv.;; movement. 
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methodological approaches by utilizing the personal and public papers of the reformers 
involved, alongside government papers. 
Traxel demonstrates how the preparation and patriotism behind World War I 
encouraged reformers to believe that change was possible. However, with the realities of 
the war loans, conscription, the Sedition and Espionage Acts, the Bolshevik Revolution 
and Wilson's failed peace talks, the American people lost their faith in idealistic reforms. 
Americans became more skeptical of supporting crusades for unrealistic changes. Traxel 
contends that with the election of Harding in 1920, the progressive movements of the 
previous twenty years came to an end. 
Traxel's book does an adequate job of incorporating components of politics, 
society and culture. However, he sometimes loses the momentum of his argument with 
his anecdotal stories about various people. Traxel's book provides a nice overview and 
an interesting argument on the culmination and end of progressivism, though it can 
become unclear at times. 
Also adding to the recent literature on the tum of the twentieth century 
scholarship is Christopher Capozzola with his 2008 work Uncle Sam Wants You: World 
War I and the Making of the Modern Citizen. Receiving his Ph.D. from Columbia in 
2002, this work was Capozzola's first published book, which is often noticeable in his 
writing. Using a political and cultural approach, he examines the relationship between 
citizens, voluntary associations and the federal government during World War I. His 
work coined the concept of "coercive voluntarism," which implies citizens and the 
government putting pressure, or force if necessary, on other citizens to participate in the 
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state-sponsored undertaking of warfare. 18 He argues that the war mobilization for World 
War I had lasting effects on the nature of American citizenship. He contends that 
"coercive voluntarism" produced the contradicting outcomes of a strong federal 
government and a growing group of liberals/radicals who sought to fight back against 
state coercion and defend civil liberties. 
Focusing largely on the poster and newspaper campaigns, while also 
acknowledging legislation passed during the war, Capozzola examines how the federal 
government enforced coercive voluntarism. His title comes from the poster of Uncle 
Sam, designed by James Montgomery Flagg in 1916, which illustrated an older man 
pointing his finger and saying "I want you for U.S. Army.,,19 Capozzola finds that such 
posters evoked political obligations out of American citizens, calling them to do their part 
for the country or else suffer the fear of mob violence or arrest. He explains that some 
patriotic Americans were so determined to enforce 100 percent Americanism that one had 
to distinguish between vigilant volunteers and vigilantism. With a lack of civil liberties 
consciousness, most Americans supported the growth of regulation by the federal 
government, especially with regards to aliens and radicals, for example German 
immigrants or pacifists. The easy passage in Congress of the Sedition and Espionage 
Acts support this claim. As a result civil libertarians began to develop civil liberties 
language and tight back against the increasing power of the federal government. 
Capozzola's book is accessible to readers, asking new questions about the 
mobilization effort on the American home front during World War 1. However, he often 
18 Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War J and the Making a/the 
Modern American Citizen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 8. 
19 Ibid., 5. 
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makes overstatements regarding both the mob violence and the civil libertarians. Instead 
of analyzing the majority of American citizens he focuses on the loud minorities, such as 
the socialists.2o 
Published in 2011, the last work for this particular historiography is Glen 
Gendzel's essay "What the Progressives Had in Common," which brings this study full-
circle through his usage of the political, cultural and social approaches. From his 
footnotes it is clear that he utilizes the arguments of the majority of the historians 
included in this chapter. In conclusion. he finds, as one could expect from the complexity 
of this historiography, that the Progressive period still remains a puzzle to historians 
today. He contends, 
When Professor Benjamin Parke De Witt of New York University sat down to 
write the first history of the progressive movement in 1915, he promised 'to give 
form and definitiveness to a movement which is, in the minds of many, confused 
and chaotic.' Apparently it \vas a fool's errand, because confusion and chaos 
continued to plague historians of early twentieth-century reform long after 
Professor De Witt laid his pen to r(;st. The muddening variety of reform and 
reformer in the early twentieth century has perpetually confounded historians' 
efforts to identify what, if anything, the progressives had in common.21 
While acknowledging that the Progressive Era is too difficult to try and understand 
completely, Gendzel contends that regardless of the differences among reformers all of 
20 In 2008, William H. Thomas Jr. published Unsafefor Democracy: World War I and 
the Us. Justice Department's Covert Campaign to Suppress Dissent (Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), in which he argues that although the Espionage 
and Sedition Acts were passed by the Legislature, the United States Justice Department 
went beyond the call of duty to suppress dissenters and radicals. Thomas focuses on the 
ideology of the U.S. government to conform Americans in the wartime period. In 2009, 
Melvin I. Urofsky published a biography of Louis D. Brandeis arguing that the man 
played four different roles: lawyer, reformer. jurist and Zionist. In conclusion he found 
that Brandeis was always an attorney first and foremost. Both Thomas and Urofsky used 
a combination of political and social history to understand the judiciary branch better. 
21 Glen Gendzel, "\Vhat the Progressives Had in Common," The Journal of the Gilded 
Age and Progressive Era 10 (July 2011): 331. 
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them shared a collective will for progress through positive statism. Using Wiebe's 
nostalgia for the small town communities, Gendzel argues that reformers believed that 
the federal government could fill that void through regulation and protection of the 
people's interests. Gendzel cites an example of this phenomenon in his study of the 1912 
election claiming that although all the candidates stood for different reforms, they all 
advocated a progressive interest through the means of a centralized government. While 
Gendzel's work is only an essay and requires much more research, he gets at the ultimate 
goal of this historiography to show the complexity of the Progressive Era and World War 
I period. 
As emphasized early, this historiography is far from complete, but it offers a taste 
of both the complexities of the Progressive Era and World War I and the complexities of 
writing about the Progressive Era and World War I. One could spend a lifetime sifting 
through the source materials from that era and still walk away bewildered. Yet that 
complexity is also the appeal of continuing to study the period. It was a dramatic 
transitional period for the American people, in which they experienced modernization, 
urbanization, industrialization and internationalization. The era may be impossible to 
understand, but scholars recognize the era's fundamental significance in United States 
history. For the purpose of this study, it is essential for the reader to grasp the complexity 
of historical context in order to appreciate the role of Louis Brandeis in helping to shape 




THE LIFE OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF CIVIL 
LIBERTIES 
The complexity that ran throughout the Progressive Era and World War I also ran 
throughout Louis Brandeis's career. The following biography and historiography of 
Brandeis will demonstrate the difficulty in finding a common thread between Brandeis's 
work on Progressive reforms, the Zionist movement, and Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
Brandeis valued evidence and approached every situation according to how he 
understood the evidence provided. In addition, Brandeis continued to educate himself 
over the course of his life and admitted to shifting his position on various issues when he 
felt he had misinterpreted the evidence the first time around. This chapter demonstrates 
where this thesis falls into the historiography of Louis Brandeis and civil liberties. 
Narrowing in on three freedom of speech cases in the post-World War I period, this paper 
displays how Louis Brandeis solidified his stance on free speech in a political democracy 
and provided the traction for future Supreme Court justices to grapple with the Founder's 
meaning of free speech. 
A Short Biography of Louis Brandeis 
Louis Brandeis was born on November 13, 1856 in Louisville, Kentucky. 
Brandeis's parents, Adolph and Frederika Brandeis, were immigrants from Eastern 
Europe who came to the United States to avoid the political and economic unrest and the 
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anti-Semitic treatment they experienced under the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. After 
several years of barely making ends meet, Adolph Brandeis established a comfortable 
living for his family in the wheat industry. During the Civil War the Brandeis family 
supported the Union and the abolition of slavery. Some of Louis's early memories came 
from those years when he would take food and water out to Union troops passing through 
or based in Louisville. I 
As the youngest of four, Brandeis was close to both his parents and siblings. His 
friendship with his brother, Alfred, lasted throughout their lives. Brandeis was also close 
to his extended family, the Wehle and Dembitz families. Frederika's brother, Lewis 
Naphtali Dembitz, proved to be Louis's role model; hence, the reason that Louis changed 
his middle name to Dembitz. Following in his uncle's example, Louis immersed himself 
in the Jewish faith and legal studies.2 In 1872, Brandeis's immediate family spent three 
years in Europe during a lull in the grain economy in the United States. During that time 
Louis attended university in Dresden, Germany. It was in the course of his studies at 
Annen-Realschule in Dresden that he learned the importance of memorizing facts. 
Brandeis placed high value on factual evidence for the rest of his life. 3 
Upon his return home, he enrolled in Harvard Law School and earned his law 
degree. While at Harvard, Brandeis welcomed the 1870 curriculum changes that 
Professor Christopher Columbus Langdell introduced to the law school. Instead of using 
textbooks, Langdell required that his students read case studies in order to gain a sense of 
I Melvin Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: A Life (New York: Pantheon Books, 2009), 10. 
2 Ibid., 19-20. 
3 Ibid., 28. 
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the law in practice.4 In regards to Langdell' s innovative teaching methods, Brandeis 
exclaimed, "The points thus incidentally learned are impressed upon the mind as they 
never could be by mere reading or by lectures; ... for they occur as an integral part of the 
drama of life.,,5 Brandeis threw himself into investigating case studies to understand the 
evidence and the methodology behind how each case was argued and decided. When his 
eyesight failed him during his years at Harvard, Brandeis had to have other students read 
to him. Drawing upon his education in Germany, Brandeis learned to memorize the 
information so that he would be prepared for exams.6 In addition to his development at 
school, Brandeis learned first-hand as a poor graduate student that a person could survive 
on frugal means. He maintained this simplistic way ofliving for the entirety of his life, 
even when he had gained a substantial fortune. 
For a short time after graduating, Brandeis worked at a law practice in St. Louis, 
Missouri, but in 1879, he decided to move back to Boston, Massachusetts. In Boston, he 
set up a law practice with his friend Sam Warren. Over the years the two men enjoyed a 
great deal of business and carried on a solid practice through the late nineteenth century. 7 
Eventually Warren left the partnership in order to run his family business, and therefore, 
in 1897, Brandeis became a senior partner at the newly founded firm of Brandeis, Dunbar 
& Nutter. As a senior partner, Brandeis filled the managerial and business role in the 
firm, while newly hired law graduates took over the majority of cases. 
In 1891, alongside working at the practice, Louis Brandeis married Alice 
Goldmark from New York City. Together they had two daughters, Susan and Elizabeth. 
4 Alpheus Mason, Brandeis: A Free Man's Life (New York: The Viking Press, 1946), 34. 
5 Ibid., 35. 
6 Ibid., 46. 
7 Urofsky, 50-58. 
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Even though he was making over a million dollars by the early twentieth century, 
Brandeis and his family continued to live a minimal lifestyle. And while establishing a 
life in New England, Brandeis and his family frequently traveled to Louisville to visit his 
parents and siblings. Family rested at the core cfBrandeis's life. Even when he was 
unable to make it home to LouisvIlle, Brandeis sent countless letters to his family 
members. 8 
Besides attending to his family and law practice. Brandeis also committed a large 
portion of his time to teaching at the Harvard Law School and other loeal universities and 
working on a number of major reforms. Teaching courses at Harvard kept Brandeis 
connected to the university and helped him identifY qualified law students for his legal 
practice. The Progressive Era created many changes in the United States, in all realms of 
life including, society, politics, economics, and religion. Brandeis was a key figure in 
advocating for reforms through legal action Brandeis worked on a variety of reform 
issues, including limiting work hours. creating savings bank insurance, restraining 
monopolies and trusts, and creating safe working conditions. Whether representing as 
legal counsel, making speeches, or serving on a board, Brandeis stayed active in these 
reform movements. For his work on protective legislation, Louis Brandeis earned the 
nickname, "the people's attorney." As historian and Brandeis biographer Melvin 
Urofsky exclaimed, "While we will occasionally refer to a public-spirited lawyer taking 
on big interests as a people's attorney, that sobriquet will always and uniquely belong to 
Louis Brandeis.,,9 
8 Mason, 72-77. 
9 Urofsky, 227. 
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A major component of Brandeis's enduring character developed out of his Jewish 
faith. While identifying as Jews, Brandeis and his family did not practice the Jewish faith 
ardently. Thus, despite the fact that most of Brandeis's first clients were Jewish, until 
1910 Brandeis did not take a firm role in Jewish society. In an interview with Jacob de 
Haas, former secretary of Theodore Herzl who started the Zionist movement, de Haas 
inspired Brandeis to get involved in Zionism when he referred to Brandeis's uncle, Lewis 
Dembitz, as a "noble Jew."IO Upon learning of his uncle's activism in the Jewish faith, 
Brandeis became interested in the Zionist work. He joined the Zionist organization in 
Boston and rose to a leadership position. Before his involvement, the Zionist movement 
lacked funds and focus. Brandeis resolved these problems by traveling the country and 
giving speeches in order to raise money and awareness for the Zionist mission. He even 
visited Palestine and other locations in Europe to develop the international ties of the 
organization. II Though Brandeis never held deep religious beliefs, he believed that 
Jewish people deserved to establish a homeland where they would secure personal rights 
and feel safe from prejudice. 
In January 1916, President Woodrow Wilson nominated Louis Brandeis to the 
Supreme Court. In the four months following the nomination, major debates took place 
in Congress over the confirmation of Brandeis. The two main reasons that Congress 
objected to his nomination were that he identified as a Republican and a Jew. Wilson's 
Democratic Party wanted a Democratic nominee and hesitated to confirm a Republican 
nominee who might not rule according to their Democratic philosophy. Furthermore, 
anti-Semitism ran throughout the United States at this time, thus the opposition to 
10 Lewis Paper, Brandeis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1983), 202. 
II Ibid., 206-208. 
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Brandeis's Jewish background was not unusual. Nonetheless, on June 1,1916, with 
Wilson's avid support of Brandeis's progressive background and competence, Congress 
confirmed Brandeis to the Supreme Court. 12 Moving his family to Washington, D.C., 
Brandeis served on the Supreme Court from 1916 to 1939. Throughout this time 
Brandeis worked on reforms and remained active in the Zionist movement. He also 
published several works on his philosophies about law, economics, religion and society, 
including his most famous work, The Curse of Bigness, published in 1934. Two years 
after retiring, Brandeis suffered a heart attack and died on October 5, 1941. His wife, 
Alice, died four years later and both of their cremated bodies were placed under the 
entranceway of the University of Louisville's law school. \3 Along with their remains, 
Brandeis left the majority of his personal papers to Louisville's law school. 
Understanding the outline of Louis Brandeis's life helps one to appreciate the 
various roles that he filled over the course of his lifetime. Furthermore, it explains how 
he developed his approach to the freedom of speech cases that are examined in this study. 
The following historiography allows one to see the great interest that scholars have 
shown in Brandeis' life. By analyzing the contextual background of civil liberties in the 
United States and considering the circumstances of World War I and the Wilson 
administration, the following segment will also demonstrate the importance of Brandeis 
in shaping the eventual jurisprudence of the First Amendment. The following two 
historiographical essays break down the prior scholarship on Justice Brandeis and civil 
liberties and suggest where this essay tits into this historical field. 
12 Ibid., 212-213. 
13 Urofsky, 753-754. 
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Historiography of Louis D. Brandeis 
Louis D. Brandeis wore many different hats in his lifetime. From lawyer to 
Zionist leader to Supreme Court Justice, Brandeis affected numerous audiences. Toward 
the latter part of his life and in the seventy years since his passing, many scholars have 
written on his influence. The following historiography offers insight into the various 
approaches that have been made in trying to understand the true Louis Brandeis. 
Furthermore, this historiography presents characteristics of Brandeis's life and 
personality that help one to appreciate Brandeis's opinions on First Amendment cases in 
the post-World War I era. 
In 1929, Jacob de Haas, a British scholar, journalist, and Jew, wrote Louis D. 
Brandeis: A Biographical Sketch. 14 Published in Brandeis's lifetime, this book placed 
special emphasis on Brandeis's role in the Zionist movement in the United States. The 
admiration that de Haas held for Brandeis came through in his writing. Providing a brief 
biography of Brandeis's life growing up in Louisville and then studying at the University 
of Dresden in Germany, de Haas skipped ahead to the 1900s when Brandeis became 
active in the Zionist movement. Before Brandeis, de Haas argued that the Zionist 
movement in America was weak. When describing Brandeis, de Haas stated, "He does 
not expound views or ideas-he only puts them into action.,,15 From raising money 
during World War I, to visiting Palestine, to arguing cases for Jewish rights, de Haas 
demonstrated how Brandeis was an activist for the Zionist movement. While de Haas 
acknowledged that Brandeis also fought for the rights of other minority groups, he failed 
14 Jacob de Haas, Louis D. Brandeis: A Biographical Sketch (New York: Bloch 
Publishing Company, 1929). 
15 Ibid., 44. 
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to detail Brandeis's accomplishments for these groups. It is clear that de Haas wrote in 
promotion of the Zionist movement and used Brandeis as its figurehead in the United 
States. 
Publishing several articles and books in his lifetime, The Curse of Bigness: 
Miscellaneous Papers of Louis D. Brandeis proved to be one of Louis Brandeis's most 
eminent works. 16 Published in 1934, the book consists of a compilation of Brandeis's 
speeches, opinions, and articles on the evils of big business in life insurance, industry, 
trusts, railroads, government, public service, and finance. 17 Throughout his work, 
Brandeis made it clear that he supported competition, but with certain regulations. He 
explained that without regulation, competition shifted in the direction of large trusts and 
monopolies. When that happened, he recognized that working class and often middle 
class people lacked fair opportunity for economic advancement. Through his role as a 
lawyer and Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Brandeis argued and 
ruled against trusts and big financial machines. In his 1890 article, "The Right to 
Privacy," co-written with Samuel Warren, his legal practice partner, Brandeis explained: 
Now the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life-the right to be left 
alone, the right to liberty secures the exercise of extensive civil privileges; and the 
term "property" has grown to comprise every form of possession-intangibles, as 
well as tangible. 18 
Brandeis contended that the individual's right to privacy extended to politics, society, and 
economics and that big business and big government limited a person's liberties. 
Brandeis and Warren believed that while individual and property rights existed since 
16 Louis Brandeis, The Curse of Bigness : Miscelianeous Papers of Louis D. Brandeis, 
edited by Osmond K. Fraenkel (New York: Viking Press, 1934). 
17 Ib'd . I ., IV. 
18 Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review, IV 
(1890). 
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before the American Constitution, the defining of these rights needed to be updated over 
time. This same perspective of Brandeis is seen in his dealings with the First 
Amendment cases in this essay. While individual rights had expanded to such issues as 
emotions and intangible belongings, Brandeis and Warren argued further that the right to 
privacy was a component of an individual's right as well. They explained that what a 
person said or did in the privacy of their own home was to be protected just as ardently as 
a person's physical possessions. This source is crucial to identifying Brandeis's 
reasoning for his judicial rulings on civil liberties. 
In 1936, Alfred Lief took a different approach to Brandeis's biography in 
Brandeis: The Personal History of an American Ideal. 19 Instead of focusing in on 
Brandeis's Zionist leadership, Lief grappled with Brandeis's personal philosophy in life. 
Lief published his book while Brandeis was in his last years of serving on the Supreme 
Court. Lief used interviews as hi s main source of information for identifying Brandeis's 
philosophical beliefs. He interviewed numerous judges, lawyers, politicians, religious 
leaders, and friends of Brandies, who all spoke highly of Brandeis's honesty and work 
ethic. Albert Einstein claimed, "I treasure the memory of my only visit to him: a person 
of swift and clear insight of keen conviction, wanting nothing but to serve society, and 
serving in the loneliness of great work.,,20 Lief took his reader through Brandeis's life 
from childhood through his struggle to be confirmed to the Supreme Court. Along the 
way, Lief utilized his interviews with people that Brandeis worked or interacted with at 
various stages in his life. The priceless interview material in Lief s work of many people 
19 Alfred Lief, Brandeis: The Personal Histor.v (~(an American Ideal (New York: 
Stackpole Sons, 1936). 
20 Ibid., 13. 
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who are now deceased is vital information to the understanding of Brandeis. However, 
Lief failed to pinpoint what American ideal that Brandeis subscribed to in his hope for all 
Americans. 
In 1946, Professor Alpheus Mason of Princeton University published Brandeis: A 
Free Man's Life.2l Beyond the classroom, Mason devoted his life to writing biographies 
of Supreme Court justices. In 1940, Louis Brandeis consented to Mason writing his 
biography and allowed Mason access to all of his public and personal papers. Mason also 
had the privilege of meeting with Brandeis on numerous occasions to discuss various 
components of his life. After Brandeis's death in 1941, Mason gathered information 
from Brandeis's friends and family, including Mrs. Alice Brandeis. Mason presented the 
contradiction of Brandeis in the minds of the American public. He contended, "All agree 
that Brandeis's achievements are remarkable, but as to the nature of his talents, as to the 
mainspring of his life and work, opinions are varying and contradictory.,,22 By 
highlighting the critiques of Brandeis's life, such as his fight against big business as a 
multimillionaire, Mason explained that Brandeis maintained consistency and purpose 
throughout his life. Mason found that by living a frugal existence with his wife, Brandeis 
donated to various groups he supported, such as savings-bank life insurance, the 
University of Louisville, and Zionist organizations. In his will, he left large sums of 
money to his wife and children with a hope that they would continue to give to charitable 
21 Alpheus Mason, Brandeis: A Free lv/an's Life (New York: The Viking Press, 1946). 
Alpheus Mason also published Bureaucracy Convicts Itselfin 1941 on the Ballinger-
Pinchot case involving Louis Brandeis. However, Brandeis: A Free Man's Life is used 
for this study because it covers a broader range of Brandeis and his impacts on U.S. law 
and society. According to Mason's obituary in the New York Times, this book sold over 
50,000 copies and stayed on the best-seller list for five months upon its release. 
22 Ibid., 4. 
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causes. Besides finances, Mason found that many critiqued Brandeis for not choosing to 
be a conservative or liberal and for either being a Jew or not being a radical Zionist. To 
counter these critiques, Mason's overall thesis claimed, "The dominant strain in Brandeis 
and in his heritage was an urgent zeal for freedom.,,23 While some scholars found 
Brandeis to be contradictory, Mason argued that throughout his life, Brandeis stood 
firmly by his independence and freedom in every decision he made. 
Shifting to a comparative approach, in 1956, scholar Samuel J. Konesfsky 
published The Legacy of Holmes and Brandeis: A Study in the Influence of Ideas?4 One 
of many scholars to write about the relationship between Supreme Court Associate 
Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis, Konesfsky argued that while the 
two men differed in their intellectual judgments, social networks, and political principles, 
they shared a common understanding of the United States Constitution. By the time that 
Louis Brandeis joined the Supreme Court in 1916, Holmes had served on the court for 
fourteen years. However, it became clear through voting and opinion writing that 
Holmes and Brandeis interpreted the law in a similar manner. For the sake of this essay, 
Konefsky's chapter ten, "If Authority Is to Be Reconciled with Freedom," addresses the 
cases in this study by examining how Holmes and Brandeis ruled on First Amendment 
cases in the post-World War I period. Konefsky contended that both men valued 
evidence over anything else in judicial decision-making and both men often drew the 
same conclusions from the evidence of various cases. Konefsky stated, "The harmony 
between Justices Holmes and Brandeis is as illuminating a commentary upon the 
23 Ibid., 641. 
24 Samuel J. Konefsky, The Legacy of Holmes und Brandeis: A Stud)) in the Influence of 
Ideas (New York: Collier Books, 1956\. 
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essentially flexible nature of America's fundamental charter as one can expect to find in 
the whole field of judicial biography. ,,25 
Over the period from 1971 to 1978, historians Melvin Urofsky and David Levy 
published five volumes of Brandeis's personal letters. The two volumes pertinent to this 
project include the letters that Brandeis wrote from] 916 to 1941 in volumes four and 
five of the series.26 In the fourth volume, the editors compiled the letters written by 
Brandeis from 1916 to 1921. The first half of this volume incorporates the letters that 
Brandeis wrote from Boston to various people in Washington about his credentials for 
serving on the Supreme Court. When President Woodrow Wilson nominated Brandeis to 
the Supreme Court a public outcry arose for two main reasons. First, Louis Brandeis 
aligned himself with the Republican Party and many members within Wilson's 
Democratic Party preferred a Democratic nomination. Secondly, Louis Brandeis was 
Jewish and anti-Semitism was a common sentiment among Americans at this time. Many 
Americans associated being Jewish with being a Socialist. However, President Wilson 
appreciated Brandeis's contributions to the Progressive movement in politics and society 
and stood by his nomination during the months that it took to confirm Brandeis to the 
Supreme Court. During that time, Brandeis wrote to stay abreast of what was being said 
and to clarify aspects of his resume. The second half of the volume is dedicated to the 
letters that Brandeis wrote to various members of the Zionist organization. Urofskyand 
25 Ibid., 279. 
26 Louis Brandeis, Letters of Louis D. Brandeis: Volume IV (1916-1921): Mr. Justice 
Brandeis, edited by Melvin Urofsky and David Levy (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1975); Louis Brandeis, Letters of Louis D. Brandeis: Volume V (1921-1941): 
Elder Statesman, edited by Melvin Urofsky and David Levy (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1978); For more primary source material on Brandeis during his 
Supreme Court years see Alexander M. Bickel's The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. 
Justice Brandeis (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967). 
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Levy explained that this emphasis on Zionist letters was due to the fact that once 
Brandeis was on the Supreme Court, he was unable to write on judicial matters. Instead, 
he would meet privately with friends and family to discuss political and judicial issues. 
Therefore, these letters help to gain a better sense of Brandeis during his first years on the 
court. As Urofsky and Levy explained, "These letters record his controversies, his 
activities, his observations, and his hopes.,,27 In the fifth volume, Urofsky and Levy 
included letters from 1921 to Brandeis's death. The letters from this time period 
demonstrate how active Brandeis was in an assortment of different projects. Urofskyand 
Levy concluded: 
Indeed, some of his finest and most enduring work, the preservation of a 
constitutional heritage open to flexibility and innovation and the protection of 
individual rights and privileges, took place during these years, and Brandeis had 
the good fortune to see some of his great dissents later become the law of the 
land?8 
These letters are significant in demonstrating how Brandeis balanced his personal life 
with his role on the Supreme Court. In his last twenty years of life, Brandeis did not slow 
down. In fact, his letters during that time show the opposite. 
In 1983, lawyer Lewis Paper published Brandeis, a biography of Louis D. 
Brandeis.29 His work was one of the first to demonstrate the significance of Brandeis's 
impact on United States history. Living through the Civil War, the Industrial Revolution, 
the Progressive movement, the First World War, the Zionist movement, the Great 
Depression, and the start of World War II, Paper argued that Brandeis played a large role 
in how the United States handled these dramatic events through legal practice, 
27 Letters of Louis D. Brandeis: Volume IV. xv. 
28 Letters of Louis D. Brandeis: Volume V, xvi. 
29 Paper, Brandeis. 
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presidential advising, and judicial service. Paper referred to Brandeis's role in the Zionist 
movement as an example of his philosophy in all realms of life. Paper contended that 
Brandeis was not a deeply religious man. Instead, he supported the Jewish homeland in 
Palestine because he wanted everyone to have the opportunity to embrace his or her 
personal freedoms. As Paper explained, "In every instance [Brandeis] was working for 
his vision of what society should be-a place where people could control their 
environments and maximize the chances of fulfilling their potential. ,,30 From childhood 
to death, Paper showed how Brandeis affected important events in America's history. As 
a lawyer, Paper emphasized Brandeis as a role model and teacher for law students, such 
as himself. 
In 1984, American scholar Philippa Strum followed Lewis Paper's work with 
Louis D. Brandeis. Justicefor the People. 31 With a background in American civil 
liberties and United States constitutionalism, Strum emphasized Brandeis's role in the 
fight for the working class people. During the Industrial Revolution, Strum argued that 
Brandeis saw a need for balance between employers and employees, in which both sides 
made joint decisions for the good of the company and the individuals involved. Strum 
contended that Brandeis drew his philosophy from Thomas Jetlerson, the ancient Greeks 
and the Hebrew faith. She explained: 
Brandeis and Jefferson held startlingly similar ideas about men and the body 
politic; the goodness but fallibility of human beings; democracy as the best 
possible political system; the central role of education in democracy; the inability 
of economically dependent citizens to be politically independent; the desirability 
30 Ibid., 4. 
31 Philippa Strum, Louis D. Brandeis: Justice/or the People (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1984); For further reading on Philippa Strum's research read Brandeis: 
Beyond Progressivism (Lmvrence: University Press of Kansas, i 993). 
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of small, controllable governmental units as close as possible to the people being 
government. 32 
Making these connections, Strum demonstrated how Brandeis modernized Jefferson's 
ideas to fit the needs of twentieth century America. She also showed how Brandeis used 
the ancient Greeks as an example of a popUlation that embraced democracy and 
demonstrated a self-fulfilled community. She argued that Brandeis's support of Zionism 
rested on the fact that he hoped the Jewish state would resemble the democratic polis of 
Athens. Finally, Strum explained that Brandeis's "inner harmony" was the result of his 
Hebraic background.33 Just as the Hebrew slaves sought to escape the Pharaoh's control, 
Brandeis sought to free workers from the control of big business employers. While 
limited by the lack of sources on Brandeis's personal life, Strum claimed to have done 
her best to demonstrate the similarities that ran throughout Brandeis's public and private 
life, including his fight for the right to privacy. 
Following their publication of the five volumes of the letters of Louis Brandeis, in 
1991 Melvin Urofsky and David Levy worked together again to produce "Half Brother, 
Half Son ": The Letters of Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Franlifurter. 34 The majority of the 
671 letters from Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter were unavailable at the time of their 
previous volumes. While they acknowledged that it would have been beneficial to 
32 Ibid., x. 
33 Ibid., 416. 
34 Louis Brandeis, "Half Brother, Half Son ": The Letters of Louis D. Brandeis to Felix 
Franlifurter, edited by Melvin Urofsky and David Levy (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991); For more work on the Brandeis and Frankfurter relationship see 
Leonard Baker's Brandeis and Fran~furter: A Dual Biography (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1984) and Nelson Lloyd Dawson's Louis D. Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter and the 
New Deal (Hamden: Archon Books, 1980); For more primary source material on Louis 
Brandeis see Urofsky and Levy's The Family Letters of Louis D. Brandeis (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2002). 
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publish the letters to Frankfurter within the context of the other letters, Urofsky and Levy 
found that a separate collection helped to highlight the significant relationship between 
the two men. Besides immediate family members, Frankfurter was the only person that 
Brandeis wrote to about personal matters and matters of the Supreme Court. Though 
usually brief correspondences, these letters reveal concerns and interests of Brandeis over 
the course of their friendship. Using the format of publishing the letters in a whole 
volume, Urofsky and Levy hoped to allow readers to make up their own minds about the 
relationship between Brandeis and Frankfurter. While disagreeing with previous scholars 
who criticized Frankfurter and Brandeis for using their alliance to push their own agendas 
through government, Urofsky and Levy acknowledged the influence of the two men and 
left the rest of the interpretation up to the reader. As they explained, "Presenting these 
letters in isolation, therefore, will illuminate aspects of the character and opinions of both 
men in ways that would have been harder to see and appreciate had they been published 
amidst letters to others.,,35 The Frankfurter-Brandeis friendship began in 1910 and their 
correspondence continued until Brandeis's death in 1941.. Reading the letters that 
Brandeis sent during the post-World War I period is important to this essay in revealing 
some of the thoughts and feelings that Brandeis held during the hearings on several First 
Amendment cases. 
Bringing this historiography into the twenty-first century, in 2007, legal historian 
O. Edward White published The American Judicial Tradition: Profiles of Leading 
American Judges. 36 Researching the continuities and changes of the judiciary over the 
35 Ibid., 3. 
36 O. Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition: Profiles of Leading American 
Judges, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2007). 
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years, White included sixteen chapters on various judges that he deemed significant. 
Chapter seven, entitled, "Holmes, Brandeis, and the Origins of Judicial Liberalism," is 
highlighted here for the specific purpose of this essay. The first part of the chapter is 
dedicated to demonstrating the difference between older thoughts on liberalism and 
modem liberalism. In modem liberalism, White contended that individuals use the 
government to restore values in society. To rescue minority groups from unequal 
treatment, Holmes and Brandeis ruled in favor of government protection of civil liberties. 
Similar to Konefsky, White acknowledged the personal differences between Holmes and 
Brandeis while illuminating their similar philosophies on regulating legislation on 
individual freedoms, such as free speech. The issue for these men rested in the fact that 
the post-World War I period was one of judicial restraint. White explained: 
The speech cases represented one such instance in which judicial self-restraint 
did not produce liberal results. Holmes and Brandeis, both of whom, in varying 
degrees, believed in tolerating legislative judgments and in vindicating free 
expression, struggled with the dilemma posed by these cases.37 
White contended that Brandeis and Holmes constituted key figures in the 
conceptualization of modem liberalism through their efforts in grappling with the conflict 
between liberal modes of judging and liberal results. 
The most recent biography to be added to this historiography is historian Melvin 
Urofsky's Louis D. Brandeis: A Life, which he published in 2009.38 Urofsky argued that 
Brandeis played four different roles throughout his lifetime: lawyer, reformer, jurist and 
Zionist. In conclusion he found that Brandeis was always an attorney first and foremost. 
37 Ibid., 151. 
38 Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: A L(fe (New York: Pantheon Books, 2009); For 
a critique of this book see Paul Brickner's "Book Review: Louis D. Brandeis: A Life," 
Albany Government Law Review 507 (2011): 955. Brickner criticizes Urofsky for giving 
Brandeis too much praise and overly emphasizing his role in the Zionist movement. 
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Urofsky explained that "[Brandeis's] attraction to the law derived in part from his belief 
that law provided the ideal means by which free men could impose order on their 
behavior and at the same time allow the greatest liberty for each person.,,39 Unlike other 
idealists of the period, Urofsky contended that through pragmatism, Brandeis converted 
all of his ideals into realities. In all realms of his life, both personal and public, he 
approached problems like a lawyer approaching a case. He analyzed the evidence and 
sought solutions that coincided with the democratic and individual freedoms of the 
United States Constitution. Using personal papers, letters, government documents, 
Zionist records, interviews and an assortment of other sources, Urofsky presented a one 
thousand-page book on the life and impact of Brandeis. His two hundred pages of 
endnotes alone have added significantly to the study of Louis Brandeis. 
This historiography highlights a sampling of the many scholarly works that have 
been published on and by Louis Brandeis. Understanding prior scholarship helps both to 
educate the reader on the significance of Brandeis and to show the void in studies on his 
life and work. This particular study will add to the historiography by taking a focused 
look at Brandeis's role in the shaping of First Amendment jurisprudence. It will draw on 
the works in this historiography for biographical information, source material, and a 
clearer understanding of Brandeis's philosophy on law and life. 
Historiography of Civil Liberties 
Before analyzing the specific Supreme Court cases in this study, it is also useful 
to recognize the arguments of historians who have previously examined the subject of 
39 Ib'd . I ., IX. 
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civil liberties in World War I und~r President Woodrow Wilson's administration. In 
1919, two members of President Wilson's cabinet wrote on the subject of the wartime 
Espionage and Sedition policies and the Committee on Public Information (CPI). Special 
assistant to the Attorney General, John Lord O'Brian, wrote "Uncle Sam's Spy Policies: 
Safeguarding American Liberty during the War" in order to defend the repressive acts 
employed by the Justice Department during the war. He contended that "the American 
spirit of fair play did not permit excesses to occur, with the exception of certain groups 
whose activities constituted willful attempts to interfere with conduct of war. ,,40 Also, in 
defense of the president's policies was George Creel, head of the Committee on Public 
Information. In 1920, he published the book How We Advertised America: The First 
Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information that Carried the 
Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe. The book condemned those 
people who argued that the wartime policies were too strict. It denounced that the 
government was trying to promote "spy hysteria" and contended that the committee 
helped the nation to gain its eventual victory at war.41 
Conversely, in 1919, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., a Harvard Law Professor, published 
"Freedom of Speech in War Time.,,42 The First Amendment concerned Chafee. He 
recognized the repression of civil liberties by the United States government as a growing 
problem. Paul Murphy described 111m as "one of the first to recognize that civil liberties 
40 John Lord O'Brian, "Uncle Sam's Spy Policics: Safeguarding American Liberty during 
the War," The Forum 61 (April 1919), 407-416. 
41 George Creel, How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of 
the Committee on Public Information that Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every 
Corner of the Globe (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1920). 
42 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., "Freedom ofSpcech in War Time," Harvard Law Review 32 
(June 1919),933-961. 
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was not only a matter of legal doctrine. but of politics as well, he both encouraged 
popular concern with the issue and deplored those who would turn the question into a 
smoke screen behind which to hide their selfish purposes.,,43 Chafee's argument was not 
widely accepted at the time and the study of the civil liberties movement lost its 
momentum until the later 1930s as the threat of a new world war loomed. 
In the late 1930s and early 1940s several works opposed the wartime policies of 
World War I in the United States. In 1939, James R. Mock and Cedric Larson published 
Words that Won the War to critique the Committee on Public Information and George 
Creel's leadership.44 In addition, H. C. Peterson wrote Propagandafor the War: The 
Campaign Against American Neutrality and James M. Read wrote Atrocity Propaganda, 
1914-1917 which both described the manipulation of propaganda used by President 
Wilson's administration to enforce government policies and suppress dissension.45 
Chafee wrote again at this time on the freedom of speech. He warned of a recurrence of 
World War I repression of freedom of speech in World War II. 46 All ofthese works were 
representative of the concerns leading up to the Second World War from a civil 
libertarian stance. The authors wrote to bring attention to an elite group of scholars, 
legislators, and lawyers. They raised the issue of government censorship to keep it from 
happening again in the likely chance of another war. 
43 Murphy, World War J, 18. 
44 James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, Word., that Won the War (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1939). 
45 H. C. Peterson, Propaganda/or War: The Campaign Against American Neutrality 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1939); James M. Read, Atrocity Propaganda, 
1914-1917 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941). 
46 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1941). 
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After World War II, not a lot was written initially because of the Cold War 
tensions and the McCarthy hysteria of seeking out communists among the American 
population and arresting them. However, in 1963, Donald Johnson wrote The Challenge 
to American Freedom: World War 1 and the Rise of the American Civil Liberties Union 
to attack the Justice Department for allowing such repressions on civil liberties to be 
enforced.47 He was followed by a series of 1960s writers who all blamed different people 
for the civil liberty issues of World War I. Harry Scheiber blamed power-seeking cabinet 
members such as Attorney General Gregory, Richard P. Longakers blamed Wilson's lack 
of concern for liberties in the face of war, Thomas A. Lawrence blamed nativists who 
feared immigrants, and William Preston blamed power elites for tricking middle-class 
Americans into believing they had rights to certain liberties.48 In the post-Vietnam era, 
many pacifists added to the historiography in an effort to speak out against war and 
militarism, including Charles Chatfield and C. Roland Marchand.49 
In 1975, Richard C. Cortner published The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties 
Policy, in which he addressed two main issues. 50 First, he examined how the national 
Bill of Rights was applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet, he 
47 Donald Johnson, The Challenge to American Freedom: World War 1 and the Rise of 
the American Civil Liberties Union (Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 
1963). 
48 Harry N. Scheiber, The Wilson Administration and Civil Liberties, 1917-1921 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1960); Richard P. Longakers, The Presidency and Individual 
Liberties (Ithaca: CornelJ University Press, 1961); Thomas A. Lawrence, "Eclipse of 
Liberty: Civil Liberties in the United States during the First World War," Wayne Law 
Review 21 (1974), 33-112; William Preston, Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression 
of Radicals, 1903-1933 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963). 
49 Charles Chatfield, For Peace and Justice, 1914-1941 (Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1971); C. Roland Marchand. The American Peace Movement and Social 
Reform (Princeton: Princeton lJniversity Press, 1972). 
50 Richard C. Cortner, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties Policy (Palo Alto: 
Mayfield Publishing Company, 1975). 
50 
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explained that the process of incorporation took time to be applied to the states even after 
Congress added the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Bill of Rights after the Civil 
War. 51 In the first chapter of the book, he traced the gradual application process of the 
federal Bill of Rights to the states. In the second and main component of his book, 
Cortner presented six United States Supreme Court cases, near to the time of his 
publication in the 1970s, to demonstrate how civil liberties policy had developed in the 
twentieth century. He argued that the Supreme Court's shifting interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment over the decades caused the shift in how Americans understood 
modern civil liberties. Aiming his book at undergraduate audience, Cortner made his 
analyses concise and to the point. He intended to demonstrate that just as with any 
component of history, "the field of constitutional policy as enunciated in Supreme Court 
decisions is one of both continuity and change. ,,52 Through the example of Supreme 
Court rulings on civil liberties, Cortner provided evidence of the continuities and changes 
in the history of constitutional policy. 
In 1979, Paul L. Murphy's World ~Var I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the 
United States added one of the most comprehensive studies of President Wilson's World 
War I policies and how the civil liberties movement developed in its wake. He asked the 
questions, "Why did they take place, and why, particularly, did they take place at this 
time? And, perhaps more importantly, what immediate and long-range reactions and 
implications in doctrinal, attitudinal, and behavioral telIDS did this development produce 
in American history?,,53 His work serves as a fundamental resource for context on the 
51 Ibid., 1-2. 
52 J.b·d .. 1 ., Vll. 
53 Murphy, World War I, 25. 
51 
Wilson administration, Espionage and Sedition Acts, and the fonnation of the American 
Civil Liberties Union. 
In 1987, Richard Polenberg published Fighting Faiths: The Abrams Case, the 
Supreme Court, and Free Speech, which focused on the 1919 judicial decision in the 
Abrams v. United States case. In the book he identified the case as a landmark to the 
definition of free speech in the United States. He presented the evidence of the case and 
then analyzed the dissenting judicial opinion of Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
and Associate Justice Louis Brandeis. His work shifted the historiography from a broad 
perspective of the civil liberty issues in World War I to a specific case study, in order to 
reveal the controversy of freedom of speech on its most basic levels.54 In 1999, Samuel 
Walker wrote In Defense of American Liberties: A History of the ACLU, which was also 
a directed study of one particular group that was born as a result of the World War I 
policies in the United States. Walker argued that as a consequence of World War I the 
ACLU established itself and played an influential role in the judicial trials of the 
twentieth century, raising issues of civil liberties throughout the United States. 55 
Richard Parker's 2003 work, Free Speech on Trial: Communication Perspectives 
on Landmark Supreme Court Decisions, was a compilation oflegal scholars' essays. The 
essays focused on the constitutionality of First Amendment and how free speech has been 
interpreted over the years. By drawing on appellate decisions and legal theory, the essays 
explored the freedom and restraints that have been placed on the First Amendment over 
54 Richard Polenberg, Fighting Faiths: The Abrams Case, the Supreme Court, and Free 
Speech (New York: Penguin Books, Ltd, 1987). 
55 Samuel Walker, In Defense of American Liberties: A History of the ACLU 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1999). 
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the years. 56 In 2008, Daniel Farber published Security versus Liberty: Conflicts between 
Civil Liberties and National Secunty in American History. Farber wrote in response to 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City. Along with the help of other 
historians, Farber argued that previous threats to national security in the twentieth century 
United States were the cause of President George W. Bush's strict security measures 
taken following the incident. Starting with World War I, Farber and historian, Alan 
Brinkley, discussed how President Wilson's administration aimed at silencing radical 
groups, such as socialists and anarchists, in order to dispel American notions of opposing 
the war. In the same way, though perhaps over-the-top, Farber contended that Bush's 
administration used AI-Qaeda members as radical scapegoats to protect internal security. 
Farber claimed that civil liberties were not indisputable. He explained that they are 
transformed with the present circumstances, as has been shown over the past century of 
United States history. 57 
In 2008, William H. Thomas Jr. published Unsafe for Democracy: World War I 
and the us. Justice Department's Covert Campaign to Suppress Dissent. 58 In his study, 
Thomas argued that "An examination of the records of the Justice Department's Bureau 
of Investigation reveals that in 1917 and 1918 the department engaged in a massive and 
largely secret effort, unprecedented in American history, to suppress opposition to the 
56 Richard Parker, Free Speech on Trial: Communication Perspectives on Landmark 
Supreme Court Decisions (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2003). 
57 Daniel Farber, Security versus Liberty: Conflicts between Civil Liberties and National 
Security in American History (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008). 
58 William H. Thomas Jr. Unsaje/l)l'Democracy: World War I and the Us. Justice 
Department's Covert Campaign to S'uppress Dissent (Madison: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2008)'. 
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war.,,59 He claimed that with the increase in progressives in political office, they pushed 
for larger government power and in tum a greater role of the Justice Department in the 
war effort. Thomas contended that the Justice Department conducted massive 
investigations of people suspected of dissenting from the war cause. In addition, the 
Justice Department took responsibility for suppressing vigilante groups that sought to 
injure or kill opponents of the war.btl By analyzing these roles played by the Justice 
Department, Thomas set his study apart from the majority of studies that strictly focused 
on the role that the Justice Department played in ruling on court cases prosecuting 
seditious acts during the war. In reality, Thomas argued that the Justice Department 
spent much more time searching for and questioning people suspected of sedition during 
the war. 61 Thomas's work offers a unique examination of the role of United States 
Justice Department outside of the courtroom. 
In 2010, Robert G. McCloskey published the latest edition of The American 
Supreme Court. 62 His work is part of the Chicago History of American Civilization 
series that includes both chronological and topical works. Publishing the first edition of 
this book in 1960, McCloskey presented a concise overview of how the United States 
Supreme Court originated and developed over the past two centuries. He contended that 
judicial review, established in 1803 in the case of ~Marbury v. Madison, shaped the future 
of the Supreme Court.63 Over the course of his book, he highlighted the shifting 
emphases of the court. For example, he explained that the first half of the nineteenth 
59 Ibid., 3. 
60 Ibid., 3-6. 
61 Ibid., 172. 
62 Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2010). 
63 Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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century, the Supreme Court dedicated itself to resolving problems of the Union. Post 
1937, McCloskey argued that the Supreme Court focused its attention on civil rights. 
Overall, McCloskey demonstrated the significant impact that the Supreme Court has 
made in United States history. 
This expansive historiography explains where historians find themselves in regard 
to civil liberties in the United States. Understanding these works is vital to the 
interpretation of the following cases in this study. It is evident from these historical 
works that the controversies over the First Amendment in World War I played a powerful 
role in the shaping of jurisprudence for the First Amendment in the twentieth century to 
the current era. Digging down to the root of the civil liberties movement of World War I, 
one can find that a rarified civil liberties consciousness grew out of Supreme Court 
decisions that ruled on the Espionage and Sedition Acts in the post-World War I period. 
Conclusion 
This historiography is two-fold. It draws on the scholarship of Louis Brandeis 
and civil liberties in order to give readers a sense of the various arguments that have been 
made about Brandeis and civil liberties during the late 1910s and early 1920s. 
Understanding Louis Brandeis's philosophies is just as important as understanding the 
nature of civil liberties during his lifetime. Through an intensive studies of three First 
Amendment cases in the post-World War I period, this essay will demonstrate the 
relationship between Louis Brandeis and the beginnings of a civil liberties awareness in 
the United States. 
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CHAPTER III 
THINKING THROUGH RATHER THAN AT THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH: 
BRANDEIS'S ROLE IN ABRAMS V. UNITED STATES 
Background to Judicial Thought About Speech and Press Prior to World War I 
Before 1917, civil liberties, specifically the freedom of speech and press, played a 
small role in American culture. In 1798, Congress enacted and President John Adams 
signed the Alien and Sedition Acts in order to suppress the dissenting opinions of 
Jeffersonians during the war with France. Led by Thomas Jefferson, the Jeffersonians 
saw the Alien and Sedition Acts as a direct threat to personal freedoms and state power. 
Historian Kermit Hall explained in his work The Magic Mirror: Law in American History 
that "the measure which imposed a penalty for publishing material creating distrust of the 
federal government, did not apply to any statements made against Thomas Jefferson, 
Adam's vice-president. Moreover, the Alien and Sedition Acts were timed to expire the 
day before Adams's term ended."l By dissolving the acts before leaving office, the 
incumbent party opened the door for people to once again speak out against the 
government, in particularly, Thomas Jefferson, the incoming President. The lack of 
public opinion toward the short-lived Alien and Sedition Acts demonstrated the lack of 
1 Kermit L. Hall and Peter Karsten, The ~tVfagic lvfirror: Law in American History, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 81. 
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public knowledge or concern towards how John Adams and Congress limited the rights 
of the First Amendment. 
The next time that Americans raised civil liberties in public debate was during the 
Civil War and Reconstruction period. Northern abolitionists "worked hard to rally 
Northern opinion against the 'slave power conspiracy' by continually charging Southern 
leaders with following a deliberate program of repression of freedom of speech and of the 
press.,,2 Following the war, Southerners continued to face civil liberty restrictions under 
martial law. The Enforcement Act of 1870 and the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 legislated 
that the federal government could restrain that particular white interest group in order to 
protect the liberties of other American citizens, in this case African Americans. While 
the Ku Klux Klan and Enforcement Acts raised these issues, the failure of the Klan to 
stay intact diffused their threats to civil liberties. 3 
In 1873, the United States Congress passed the Comstock Act, which prohibited 
"obscene" material from being sent through the United States Postal System.4 With no 
clear definition of "obscene," the judiciary had to interpret and decide what was deemed 
to be obscene for the American people and the United States Postal Service. In turn, the 
judicial branch stipulated that contraception fell into the category of obscenity. When Dr. 
2 Paul L. Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1979),51-56. 
3 For more information on issues of free speech during the Civil War years see Michael 
Kent Curtis, Free Speech, "The People's Darling Privilege (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2000). In this book, Curtis argues that struggles for the freedom of speech over the 
course of the nineteenth century went beyond the First Amendment. Indeed, Curtis 
contended freedom of speech debates formed the core of democratic government. As 
people argued over what the freedom of speech meant, Americans gained a clearer 
understanding of their constitutional rights in general. 
4 David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 24. 
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Edward Foote wrote a medical piece that included information for women on 
contraception, the federal courts convicted him of breaking the law. Following the case, 
Foote spent the remainder of this life defending the freedom of speech. 5 Beside Foote 
and other medical specialists, many who identified themselves as free lovers opposed the 
restrictions of the Comstock Act. However, these groups remained isolated, keeping 
their causes separate and therefore, limiting their power against the majority of 
Americans who observed and respected the Comstock law. 
In the late nineteenth century, working class groups protested in the 1886 
Haymarket agitation and the 1894 Pullman Strike against the limitations of organizing 
and publicizing their working conditions.6 The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) 
advocated on behalf of working class Americans. Legal scholar David Rabban 
explained, "Various forms of direct action, the IWW believed, would ultimately lead to a 
general strike, which would paralyze industry and bring about the abolition of 
capitalism.,,7 Unhappy with the working conditions of American laborers, the IWW 
promoted strikes and demonstrations. Oftentimes, these forms of direct action led police 
to arrest IWW members for "obstructing the sidewalk, blocking traffic, vagrancy, 
unlawful assembly, or violating a local ordinance against street speaking."g Most of the 
convicted IWW members pleaded not guilty on the grounds of their First Amendment 
rights. Yet, these events did not gather full public interest because of the negative stigma 
ofthe IWW organization as a proponent of anarchy. While Americans were aware of the 
IWW free speech fights, most Americans did not support the IWW's call for the end to 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 35. 
7 Rabban, 81. 
g Ibid. 
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capitalism and constitutional government. Therefore, the workers' movement did not 
incite the force of the civil liberty movement of the twentieth century. 
It was not until Congress enacted the wartime policies of World War I that a 
rarified, elite group of lawyers, legislators, and civil liberties interest groups started to 
understand and become concerned about how the United States government managed 
civil liberties. 
In 19 J 9, the Supreme Court decided on two key freedom of speech cases, Schenck 
v. United States and Abrams v. United States. Federal judges convicted the defendants in 
both cases of violating the Sedition and Alien Acts that President Woodrow Wilson and 
his administration created to curb dissent during the war years. Both defendants appealed 
their convictions to the United States Supreme Court on the basis that the Alien and 
Sedition Acts violated their freedom of speech protected under the First Amendment. 
With no precedent jurisprudence on the Alien and Sedition Acts of World War I, the 
Supreme Court had to sift its way through the evidence. It is necessary to examine how 
the Supreme Court ruled on both of these cases in order to appreciate how, in the course 
of one year, Associate Justices Louis Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. revised 
and solidified their understanding of the freedom of political speech. This shift in 
Brandeis and Holmes's judicial opinions from the Schenck case to the Abrams case laid 
the foundation for Brandeis's significant role in shaping the jurisprudence of free political 
speech in the United States. 
The Facts, h<;ues, and Decision afSchenck vs. United States 
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On September 17, 1917, the judge of the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania 
convicted Charles Schenck of crimes under the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917. 
According to the court record, in August 1917, the Pennsylvania police obtained a 
warrant from the judge of the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania to search the 
Socialist Party headquarters where Schenck worked as its General Secretary. Police 
found that Schenck's secretarial books identified an order of 15,000 leaflets to be printed 
and mailed out to "men who had passed exemption boards, and for distribution.,,9 
Schenck not only placed the order for the leaflets but he also worked on addressing 
envelopes and sending the leaflets out through the mail. In addition, police found a 
receipt for 125 dollars to be given to Schenck for the printing project. Because of the 
plethora of evidence identifying Schenck as a key figure in the printing project, no issue 
over his involvement existed; both sides stipulated to the facts in the case. However, the 
argument of the case lie in what the leaflet stated. Schenck was not arrested for printing 
and distributing a leaflet, but the police arrested him for printing and distributing a leaflet 
that police deemed to incite anti-war action. 
Prosecution argued, "While the United States was at war, defendants circulated 
leaflets that urged men to refuse to submit to the draft into military service." Therefore, 
the prosecution determined, "for attempting to obstruct military recruitment, defendants 
were convicted of crimes pursuant to the Espionage Act, 40 Stat. 217, 219.,,10 In the 
Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania, the judge convicted the defendants. In response, 
Charles Schenck's lawyers, Henry Nelson and Henry Gibbons, appealed to the Supreme 
9 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
10 Ibid., 1. 
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Court of the United States, contending that "the distribution of the leaflets was activity 
protected by the First Amendment." I I 
Americans in the World War I period saw the rise of the American Civil Liberties 
Union under Roger Baldwin. The ACLU was "born out of the fight to defend free speech 
during World War 1.,,12 Just as the Supreme Court struggled with Wilson's wartime 
policies, the ACLU made the fight for the First Amendment their guiding cause. As 
Samuel Walker explained: 
Vocal opposition to the war sprang up immediately after Congress declared war 
on April 6. Indeed, it was the second most unpopular war in American history, 
rivaled only by the Vietnam War. Its critics were diverse: Socialists, religious 
pacifists, German-Americans and Irish-Americans, recent Eastern European 
immigrants, and isolationists. 13 
Several members from these groups organized together in order to strengthen their 
argument. Crystal Eastman and Roger Baldwin were two of the most outspoken and they 
banded together in the National Civil Liberties Bureau to fight against Congress's 1917 
conscription measure. By 1918 they realized they needed to be fighting against much 
bigger issues than just the draft. Following the passage of the Espionage and Sedition 
Acts, Eastman and Baldwin shifted their focus to larger issues of the rights of speech, 
press, and assembly. However, as identified Socialists, members of the Civil Liberties 
Bureau faced a great deal of criticism from Wilson's administration. Nonetheless, the 
Civil Liberties Bureau continued to publicize their opinions through leaflets and memos. 
By 1919, Baldwin increased the membership of the Civil Liberties Bureau and 
developed such a following to create the American Civil Liberties Union. The writings 
II Ibid. 
12 Walker, 3. 
13 Ibid., 12-13. 
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of Zechariah Chafee influenced strongly the ACLU members and inspired them to rally 
behind Chafee's beliefs on the freedom of speech. In the cases of Schenck, Debs, and 
Abrams, the ACLU organized mass meetings to build up public support behind the 
defendants, but Baldwin soon gave up because "auditorium managers were reluctant to 
rent to him, and many of the prominent liberals he tried to recruit backed away.,,14 
Nonetheless, the ACLU continued to help the cause by providing the funding and 
attorneys for other civil liberties cases. Walker explained, "By the fall of 1917 the 
NCLB's cooperating attorneys were handling about 125 conscientious objector cases a 
week."IS Though rarely successful in their cases and oftentimes criticized by the media, 
the ACLU played a large role in planting the seed of civil liberties that developed into the 
rights consciousness of modern society. 
On January 9 and 10, 1919, Schenck's lawyers, Henry Nelson and Henry 
Gibbons, who had ties to the ACLU, argued his case in front of the Supreme Court, a 
year and a half after Schenck's arrest and two months after the conclusion of World War 
1. Appealing a case to the Supreme Court was a tedious and expensive process. Only a 
handful of cases from World War I made it to the Supreme Court level because of these 
circumstances. Of the handful, Schenck was one. The case was important because it 
raised such issues as the First Amendment, freedom of speech, freedom of press, 
conspiracy, socialism, mail service, enlistment service, constitutional rights, and 
Congressional policy. Furthermore, it was one of the first cases to come out of World 
War I on the basis of the Espionage Act of 1917. By appealing the case to the Supreme 
14 Ibid., 23. 
IS Ibid., 24. 
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Court, it allowed more lawyers, judges, and legislators to become aware of the significant 
issues it raised. 
On March 3, 1919, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments ofthe District 
Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and upheld Charles 
Schenck's jail sentence. The vote was unanimous. Justices serving on the United States 
Supreme Court at that time were Chief Justice Edward White, Associate Justice Joseph 
McKenna, Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Associate Justice William Day, 
Associate Justice Willis Van Devanter, Associate Justice Mahlon Pitney, Associate 
Justice James McReynolds, Associate Justice Louis Brandeis, and Associate Justice John 
Clarke. Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote the unanimous opinion for 
Court. 
Holmes's opinion began by stating that the Supreme Court found the defendant 
guilty of all three counts in his indictment. Holmes wrote that Schenck conspired against 
the Espionage Act of 1917 by "causing and attempting to cause insubordination in the 
military and naval forces of the United States, and to obstruct the recruiting and 
enlistment service of the United States, when the United States was at war with the 
German Empire:,16 Secondly, the Court found Schenck to be guilty of conspiring to use 
the mail service to transmit materials that were deemed illegal by the standards of the 
Espionage Act. Third, the Court found Schenck to be guilty of using the mail service to 
transmit the unlawful materials. The sufficiency of evidence proved Schenck to be 
highly involved, if not leading the Socialist headquarters, in all of these illegal 
conspIracIes. 
16 Ibid., 4. 
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After confirming the guilt of Schenck's involvement, Holmes turned to the 
argument of the defense. In assessing the claim of the right to the First Amendment to 
print materials, in dicta Holmes declared that the privilege was limited when there was a 
"clear and present danger" in the speech or print. He expJained that: 
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that 
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It 
is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things that 
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance 
will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as 
protected by any constitutional right! 7 
Holmes articulated that in times of war, the Supreme Court felt that freedom of political 
speech needed to be monitored more closely for the internal and external security of the 
country. Holmes faced difficulties in writing this opinion because the Supreme Court 
lacked precedent casework on the First Amendment. Furthermore, his judicial career 
demonstrated "little consideration for freedom of expression, as evidenced by his 
opinions in Cowley v. Pulsifer (1892), Hamwn v. Globe Newspaper Company (1893), and 
Commonwealth v. Davis (1895)." 18 Therefore, Holmes crafted the Schenck opinion based 
on his personal experience and criminal law standards of evidence. Holmes applied the 
"question of proximity" criminal law standard to the Schenck case by doing a thorough 
analysis of the leaflet that Schenck and the Socialist Headquarters had distributed. 
Specific quotes that Holmes referred to in the leaflet included, "Assert Your Rights ... 
your right to assert your opposition to the draft. ... If you do not assert and support your 
rights, you are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is the solemn duty of all 
I"' b'd ' I 1 ., 5. 
18 Parker, Free Speech on Trial, 21. 
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citizens and residents of the United States to retain.,,19 In the opinion of the Supreme 
Court, these statements not only expressed the opinion of the Socialists, but these 
statements called on American citizens to act directly. By sending the leaflets to drafted 
men, the Supreme Court could find no other intention for the flyer than calling on these 
men to refuse the draft and stay home in violation of the Sedition Act. 
However, while Holmes emphasized that such a leaflet would not be ruled 
unconstitutional in peace times, he insisted: 
The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done .... 
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely 
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from 
an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect offorce.2o 
Thus, even out of wartime, Holmes deemed any speech that put others in danger was not 
protected under the First Amendment. Notice that Holmes did not say a "crowded" 
theatre; indeed, he believed that even if one person was endangered as a result of 
someone else's speech then the Court would rule it unconstitutional. The fact that his 
opinion went beyond war times to peacetime examples, such as someone shouting "fire" 
in a theater, set an important precedent for the Supreme Court in ruling on the freedom of 
speech in the following years and decades. 
Once handed down, Holmes was unaware that his opinion would be so 
scrutinized. In fact, he hoped the Chief Justice would assign him the case, as he admitted 
to his friend Harold Laski that "[I] hoped the case would be assigned to [me], yet it 
'wrapped itself around me like a snake in a deadly struggle to present the obviously 
proper in the forms oflogic. '" Within two weeks of deciding Schenck, Holmes wrote 
19 Schenck, 4. 
20 Ibid., 4-5. 
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again to Laski, admitting, "I greatly regret having to write them.,,21 Even for a powerful 
jurisprudential mind like Holmes, the crafting of jurisprudence for the First Amendment 
proved difficult because he and his brethren built on almost no precedent and 
jurisprudential heritage. 
The Supreme Court applied the "clear and present danger" test to several cases 
following the Schenck case, including Frohwerk v. United States (1919) and Debs v. 
United States (1919). In Frohwerk, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Jacob 
Frohwerk for writing newspaper editorials that condemned American involvement in the 
war. In Debs, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Socialist Party's presidential 
candidate, Eugene Debs, for making an anti-war speech on a street comer in 1918. In 
hindsight, both Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis vocalized regret in their initial 
rulings on freedom of speech cases coming out of World War I. In public, Holmes 
tended to cover up his discomfort with these initial rulings by repeatedly claiming, "I 
never have seen any reason to doubt that the questions of the law that alone were before 
this Court in the cases of Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs . .. were rightly decided." On the 
other hand, Brandeis was more forthcoming in taking responsibility for the Supreme 
Court's misunderstanding of the freedom of speech in these cases. In a letter to Harvard 
Law Professor Felix Frankfurter, Brandeis exclaimed, "I have never been quite happy 
about my concurrence in the Debs and Schenck cases. I had not then thought the issues 
of freedom of speech out. I thought at the subject, not through it."n Fortunately the 
Abrams case argued later that year allowed Brandeis and Holmes a fresh opportunity, a 
21 Parker, ~Free Speech on Triai, 21. 
22 Ibid., 26. 
66 
second bite at the judicial apple, to reexamine the issue of the freedom of speech and the 
First Amendment even in wartime. 
The Facts, Issues, and Decision of Abrams VS. United States 
Nine months after the Supreme Court decided Schenck, a prosecution with the 
same defense of the right to the First Amendment arose to the Supreme Court in the case 
of Abrams vs. United States (1919). A large difference between the two cases was that 
Jacob Abrams, Mollie Steimer, Hyman Lachowsky, Samuel Lipman, and Jacob Schwartz 
were Russian immigrants in the United States whereas Charles Schenck was an American 
citizen. Abrams, Steimer, Lachowsky, Lipman, and Schwartz all immigrated to the 
United States between 1908 and 1913 to escape the anti-Semitic treatment of the Russian 
Czar's government. As young Russian and Jewish immigrants, they all found jobs in 
factories under working class conditions.23 Unsatisfied with their position in America, 
they began to read more to find out how to find better working conditions. Slowly they 
joined together with other frustrated workers and created an anarchist organization to 
fight against government regulations and poor working conditions of the working people. 
Their organization became politicized due to the Russian Revolution of 1917. 
The start of World War I and the passage of the Espionage Act of 1917 and the 
Sedition Act of 1918 had a large impact on Abrams, Steimer, Lipman, Lachowsky, and 
Schwartz. When internal unrest erupted in Siberia in April 1918, President Wilson saw a 
need for intervention. In August 1918, he sent American troops to Russia to prevent 
another military conflict before it got out of hand and to intimidate Vladimir Lenin and 
23 Richard Polenberg, Fighting Faiths: The Abrams Case, the Supreme Court, and Free 
Speech (New York: Viking, 1987),4-5. 
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the Bolshevik Party. The start of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia sent waves of fear 
through many Americans, including Wilson who feared that the Bolsheviks were "merely 
German pawns, and that military intervention would be a reasonable way of blocking 
German domination of Russia.,,24 In response, such Russian immigrants as Abrams, 
Steimer, Lipman, Lachowsky, and Schwartz believed it was not America's place to 
intervene in a social revolution in Russia. These anarchists longed for political change in 
Russia. After all, the Czarist government had made them flee in the first place. With a 
desire to publicize their discontent with American intervention in the Russia Revolution, 
Abrams, Steimer, Lipman, Lachowsky, and Schwartz wrote and printed two leaflets. 
Samuel Lipman wrote one leaflet in English and Jacob Schwartz wrote a second leaflet in 
Yiddish. Then the leaflets were printed in mass volumes and distributed by Abrams, 
Steimer, Lipman, Lachowsky, and Schwartz from apartment windows and on street 
corners.25 
It was not long before police became aware of the pamphlets and concerned 
American citizens called for an investigation of the authors. After a difficult search, the 
police arrested the anarchists and took them to federal court. The federal government 
tried them in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New 
York where the Court found them guilty and denied bail. Harry Weinberger, attorney for 
the defendants, appealed this ruling on the basis of the First Amendment freedom of 
speech and press. The case reached the Supreme Court on October 21 and 22, 1919. The 
defendants were charged with: 
24 Ibid., 37. 
25 Ibid., 49-51. 
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Conspiring, when the United States was at war with Germany, to publish disloyal 
language about the form of government of the United States, which was intended 
to bring the form of the government imo contempt. to incite resistance to the 
United States in the war, to advocate curtailment of production of ammunition 
essential to the war. 26 
The prosecution, represented by Assistant Attorney General Stewart, blamed the 
defendants with violating the Sedition Act of 1918 in these crimes. After having decided 
Schenck just a few months before, the Supreme Court went into this case with the judicial 
doctrine of the "clear and present danger test" laid out in Holmes's unanimous opinion. 
Abrams raised a variety of issues including, revolution, conspiracy, freedom of speech 
and press, denouncement of government, anarchy, non-United States citizenship, and the 
distribution of circulars. 
On November 10, 1919 the Supreme Court decided by a vote of 7-2 to affirm the 
defendants' convictions. Associate Justice John H. Clark wrote the majority opinion 
declaring that sufficient evidence found the defendants to be guilty on four counts. On 
the first count, the Supreme Court found the defendants guilty of speaking in contempt of 
the United States Government. In the second count, Clark and the majority held that the 
leaflets contained language that gave the United States a disreputable name. In the third 
count, the majority of the Supreme Court found that the language used provoked people 
to act out against the United States. In the fourth count, Clark and the majority found that 
the defendants conspired to disrupt the war efforts ofihe United States. 
The Supreme Court took into account the fact that all five defendants were 
Russian natives and had not applied for United States citizenship in their five to ten years 
in America. Clark stated this about the defendants in the majority opinion, "They were 
26 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
69 
------------~~~ 
intelligent, had considerable schooling, and at the time they were arrested they had lived 
in the United States terms varying from five to ten years, but none of them had applied 
for naturalization.,,27 This raised suspicions among the majority of the Court about the 
true intentions of the defendants in choosing to live and work in the United States. In 
addition, Clark explained: 
Four of them testified as witnesses in their own behalf and of these, three frankly 
avowed that they were "rebels," "revolutionists," "anarchists," that they did not 
believe in government in any form, and they declare that they had no interest 
whatever in the Government of the United States. The fourth defendant testified 
that he was a "socialist" and believed in "a proper kind of government, not 
capitalistic," but in his classification the Government ofthe United States was 
"capitalistic. ,,28 
These self-characterizations declared by the defendants proved to the majority of the 
Supreme Court that the defendants held ill will for the United States government and that 
their circulars stemmed from their anti-government sentiments. 
From there, Clark refuted the defendants argument for their freedom of speech by 
citing the case of Schenck vs. United States, Baer vs. United States (1919), and Frohwerk 
vs. United States (1919) to demonstrate that the defendants use of freedom of speech was 
a "clear and present danger" to the rest of the American community.29 He drew upon 
specific references in the leaflets to demonstrate the "clear and present danger." He 
quoted several citations in the leaflets pertaining to President Wilson's character 
including: 
He [the President] is too much of a coward to come out openly and say: 'We 
capitalistic nations cannot afford to have a proletarian republic in Russia.' The 
Russian Revolution cries: Workers of the World! Awake! Rise! Put down your 
27 Ibid., 3. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 4; Baer vs. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); and Frohwerk vs. United States, 
249 U.S. 204 (1919). 
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enemy and mine! Yes! Friends, there is only one enemy of the workers of the 
world and that is CAPITALISM.3D 
Clark emphasized that such language urged working class citizens in the United States to 
rise up against the United States government. Clark argued that language that evoked 
this kind of direct action was a threat to Homeland Security and would not be tolerated. 
He went on to further point out examples of the leaflets inciting readers to take action by 
quoting, "Do not let the Government scare you with their wild punishment in prison, 
hanging and shooting. We must not and will not betray the splendid fighters of Russia. 
Worker, up to fight.,,3! Clark and the majority of the Supreme Court maintained that 
these examples along with a number of other quotes from the leaflets demonstrated 
strong evidential proof that the defendants posed a "clear and present danger" to the 
United States. 
Furthermore, Clark pointed to quotes from the pamphlets that pertained to 
America's involvement in the war. Clark and the majority of the Supreme Court found 
that following lines proved that the Russian defendants sought to interfere with the 
United States war with Germany: 
With the money which you have loaned, or are going to loan them, they will make 
bullets not only for the Germans, but also for the Workers Soviets of Russia. 
Workers in the ammunition factories, you are producing bullets, bayonets, 
cannon, to murder not only the Germans, but also your dearest, best, who are in 
Russia and are fighting for freedom. 32 
Clark maintained that if ammunition factory workers were to quit producing ammunition, 
the United States soldiers on the frontlines with Germany would suffer because of a lack 
of supplies. Thus, while the Russians claimed that their priority was protecting the 
3D b A rams, 4. 
3! Ibid., 5. 
32 Ibid., 5. 
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Russian Revolution from United States involvement, Clark argued that the defendants' 
messages went beyond that and posed a clear threat to the United States war effort 
against Germany. Besides a general strike that could cut off supply lines to United States 
troops in Europe, Clark also contended that: 
The plain purpose of their propaganda was to excite, at the supreme crisis of the 
war, disaffection. sedition, riots, and, as they hoped, revolution, in this country for 
the purpose of embarrassing and if possible defeating the military plans of the 
Government in Europe.33 
Undoubtedly, the majority of the Supreme Court found the true intent of the Russian 
defendants to go beyond their claim of merely supporting their Russian comrades in the 
Bolshevik Revolution. Clark and six other justices found sufficient evidence in the 
pamphlets to demonstrate that the defendants encouraged "resistance to the United States 
in the war.,,34 
Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who had written the unanimous 
opinion in the Schenck case in the spring of 1919, in the fall of 1919 wrote the minority 
opinion in the Abrams case. With the support of Associate Justice Louis Brandeis, these 
justices in minority claimed, "the United States constitutionally may punish speech that 
produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about 
forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to 
prevent. ,,35 In crafting such a rule, Holmes refined his previous opinion of Schenck. 
Holmes modified the "clear and present danger" standard rule into the "imminent threat" 
standard rule. He and Brandeis argued that while the leaflets of the defendants called for 
the derailing of the United States government, they did not see how "anyone can tind the 
33 Ibid., 6. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 7. 
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intent required by the statute in any of the defendants words. ,,36 He referred to the 
postscript on the first leaflet that contended that the Russian authors were not trying to 
support the Germans. The postscript read, "It is absurd to call us pro-German. We hate 
and despise German militarism more than do you hypocritical tyrants. We have more 
reasons for denouncing German militarism than has the coward of the White House.,,37 
Holmes and Brandeis pointed out that the postscript constituted clear evidence that the 
defendants were not trying to interfere with the United States war with Germany. The 
defendants only sought to raise awareness of the situation in Russian. Holmes 
maintained: 
The second leaflet is the only one that affords even a foundation for the charge, 
and there, without invoking the hatred of German militarism expressed in the 
former one, it is evident from the beginning to the end that the only object of the 
paper is to help Russia and stop American intervention there against the popular 
government-not to impede the United States in the war that it was carrying on. 
Examining the same phrases as Clark, Holmes and Brandeis fpund a lack of evidence 
proving that the Russian defendants intended to hinder the American efforts against 
Germany. Indeed, Holmes and Brandeis argued that the only purpose for the pamphlets 
was to keep American troops out of the Russian Revolution. Holmes contended that 
those who believed the defendants to be guilty were misconstruing their words and 
objectives. 
In his conclusion, Holmes declared in now famous civil liberties language: 
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come 
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations oftheir own conduct 
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in the ideas - that the 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their 
36 Ibid., 8. 
37 Ibid., 7. 
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wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution 
.... While that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be 
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we 
loath and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten 
immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an 
. d· h k· . d h 38 Imme late c ec IS reqUlre to save t e country. 
In this conclusion, Brandeis and Holmes argued that the convictions of the defendants 
ought to be overturned because they did not interfere with the war cause nor did they 
violate the Sedition Act. Holmes warned that by convicting the defendants, the United 
States denied the freedom of expression that was essential to bringing new ideas to the 
nation. In this dramatic conclusion, Holmes emphasized the values that the United States 
was founded upon in the late eighteenth century_ Holmes feared the effects of the 
Supreme Court limiting the freedom of speech. He warned that continuous checks on the 
freedom of expression would ultimately lead to the destruction of the United States 
because the Constitution would no longer protect the rights of the people. 
In this minority opinion, Holmes wrote and Brandeis concurred with a new rule to 
the "clear and present danger" precedent. Indeed, Holmes and Brandeis's proposed 
"imminent threat" standard rule proved to have long lasting effects on the jurisprudence 
of the freedom of speech. 
An Analysis of Holmes and Brandeis and Their Sh(fiing Stance on 
Freedom of Speech in 1919 
Following the Abrams decision, Holmes upheld his former decisions in cases such 
as Schenck vs. United States and Debs vs. United States (1919) because he claimed that 
those cases proved defendants were inciting a "clear and imminent danger" to the United 
38 Ibid., 8. 
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States' war with Germany.39 However, in the Abrams case Holmes made it clear that he 
had taken the time to reflect on the issue of the First Amendment, and he had shifted from 
his initial judgment in Schenck.4o As Stanford University legal historian Lawrence 
Friedman argued about Holmes's shift after the Schenck case, "Holmes did some soul-
searching, and in the next free-speech case, Abrams v. United States, Holmes changed his 
mind somewhat; in this case he wrote a strong dissent.,,41 Following the Schenck 
decision, Holmes read many critiques of hIS judicial opinion, including the work of 
Zechariah Chafee. In response to Holmes's example of someone shouting "fire" in a 
theatre and causing a panic, Chafee exclaimed, "How about the man who gets up in a 
theater between the acts and informs the audience honestly but perhaps mistakenly that 
the fire exits are too few or locked? He is a much closer parallel to Schenck or Debs.,,42 
During the summer between Schenck and Abrams, Holmes read Zechariah Chafee's 
book, Freedom a/Speech in War Time, in which Chafee claimed, "In the Espionage Act 
cases, Holmes had missed a 'magnificent opportunity' to indicate where to draw the 
line.,,43 Holmes invited Chafee for tea to discuss free speech. In turn, it was clear that 
Holmes had begun to reconsider his original position on the issue and that those who had 
critiqued his opinions in Schenck and Debs influenced him. His minority opinion in 
39 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
40 During the nine months between the two cases, documentation of Holmes's personal 
correspondences with Judge Learned Hand and Harold Laski, demonstrated his lingering 
uncertainty in his initial opinion; Parker, Free Speech on Trial, 21. 
41 Lawrence M. Friedman, American Law in the 20th Century (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002), 142. 
42 Parker, Free Speech on Trial, 24. 
43 Zechariah Chafee, Freedom a/Speech in War Time (Cambridge, MA: Dunster House 
Bookshop, 1919). 
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Abrams reflected his reconsideration of the First Amendment. To support this shift in his 
opinion, he drew on what he interpreted to be the true meaning of the Constitution. 
In the same way, Louis Brandeis spent the nine months between the Schenck and 
Abrams cases doing what he did best, reviewing the evidence and examining the 
constitutional right of freedom of speech through a Progressive lens. In response to 
Holmes's dissenting opinion, Brandeis stated, "I join you heartily & gratefully. This is 
fine-very.,,44 Upon learning that the conviction would be upheld, Abrams and the other 
Russian immigrants in the case attempted to flee the country. In time, the federal 
government and New York state police rounded them back up and imprisoned them. In a 
statement to the press, Hyman Lachowshky exclaimed: 
Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis have said that I had as much right to 
give out these leaflets as the United States has to issue its own Constitution. 
When my country, Soviet Russia, takes her equal place among the Nations of the 
world, recognized by all the Nations of the world, Russia will demand my 
freedom. I am willing to be that sacrifice in the hope that by it, the true liberty-
loving heart of America will awaken from its deadly sleep caused by the 
Espionage Law under which I was convicted.45 
Indeed, the Abrams case did awaken the legal community of the United States, especially 
Justice Brandeis who moved forward from the case with a reformed approach to ruling on 
the freedom of speech. Yet, while the Abrams case allowed Brandeis to think through the 
freedom of speech more methodically it would not be until 1920 that Brandeis wrote his 
own judicial opinion on the matter. Up to that point, Holmes had taken the lead in 
writing the judicial opinions on Schenck and Abrams; consequently, Brandeis did not 
have the opportunity to express his own analysis of the freedom of speech. In 1923, 
Brandeis sent Felix Frankfurter a letter about the Supreme Court rulings on the Schenck, 
44 Polenberg, 236. 
45 Ibid., 246. 
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Frohwert, and Debs. In this letter Brandeis explained, "Of course you must also 
remember that when Holmes writes, he doesn't give a fellow a chance-he shoots so 
quickly.,,46 Thus, while Brandeis concurred with Holmes in judicial opinions on freedom 
of speech cases in 1919, he sought to explain himself on the matter. In 1920, he had the 
chance to do so. 
Conclusion 
Close analysis of the Schenck and Abrams cases provides historians insight into 
the American political and social realm of World War 1. Public opinion favored Wilson's 
stand on espionage and sedition and from the small history of civil liberties prior to 
World War I it is evident why. American people wanted domestic security and a victory 
abroad; therefore, the American people accepted Wilson's wartime policies. President 
Wilson's administration identified the socialist background of Charles Schenck and the 
anarchist and foreign-born backgrounds of Abrams, Steimer, Lipman, Lachowsky, and 
Schwartz as internal threats to the country. Even before the federal government accused 
these men and women, the United States government monitored them for suspicious 
behavior. With the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918, the Supreme 
Court had a difficult task in applying the new standards to the First Amendment. The 
Supreme Court had a tricky time determining whether a person was using their freedom 
of speech or causing a threat to internal security during wartime. Examining Brandeis 
and Holmes's shifting judicial opinions in 1919 demonstrates the difficulty of ruling on 
the constitutionality of restricting the First Amendment. 
46 Ibid., 266. 
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By dissenting on the Abrams case, Holmes and Brandeis played key roles in 
shaping the eventual jurisprudence of the freedom of political speech. Though they 
represented the minority in 1919, their dissenting argument that the "clear and present 
danger" test needed to be modified to the higher standard of the "imminent threat" test 
ultimately became the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in the 1969 case of 
Brandenburg v. Ohio. 47 Fifty years prior to the ruling on Brandenhurg, Brandeis and 
Holmes laid the foundation for the jurisprudence of the freedom of speech that most 
Americans find commonplace in the current era. In 2012, Historian Mark Tushnet wrote 
in a law review that referenced the Abrams dissent of Holmes and Brandeis. Tushnet 
argued, 
Like all risks, the First Amendment risk varies along several dimensions, of which 
I will focus on three ... Risks can vary in magnitude as well: an anonymous 
pamphlet by a puny anonymity, to adopt on of Justice Holmes's phrases (Abrams 
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, 1., dissenting)), increases the 
risk of law-breaking by a small amount; a speech by a person with great oratorical 
skills might increase the risk more. The circumstances under which words are 
uttered may affect the magnitude of the risk they impose.48 
This statement provides a clear example of how the language and concepts used by 
Brandeis and Holmes to define the freedom of speech nearly a century ago maintain 
relevance and importance to the modem day. Still, Brandeis's role in the dissenting 
Abrams opinion was just the start of his work in reforming the judicial ruling on the 
47 Brandenburg vs. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
48 Mark Tushnet, "The First Amendment and Political Risk," 4 Harvard Law Review 103 
(Spring 2012). For further reading on recent law reviews that address the dissent of 
Brandeis and Holmes in the Abrams case please see Mark Strasser, "Mill, Holmes, 
Brandeis, and a True Threat to Brandenburg," 26 Brigham Young Law Review 37 (2011) 
and Vincent Blasi, "31 st Annual Sullivan Lecture: Shouting "Fire!" in a Theatre and 
Vilifying Com Dealers," 39 Capital University Law Review 535, (Summer 2011). 
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freedom of speech. The following two chapters will trace the transformation of Brandeis 
into his firm stance on the civil liberty of speech. 
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CHAPTER IV 
WRITING HIS OWN OPINION: 
BRANDEIS'S MINORITY DECISION IN GILBERTV. MINNESOTA 
The Facts and Issues of Gilbert v. Minnesota 
In 1920, a year following the Abrams decision, the United States Supreme Court 
decided another freedom of speech case that arose from the World War I era. This time, 
however, the defendant was not convicted of breaking the federal Sedition or Espionage 
Acts. On August 18, 1917, a state jury convicted Joseph Gilbert, manager of the Non-
partisan League, of violating a Minnesota statute that prohibited the obstructing or 
opposing of men enlisting in the United States military. The Minnesota statute read: 
A statute of Minnesota makes it unlawful to interfere with or discourage the 
enlistment of men in the military or naval forces of the United States or of the 
State of Minnesota. It shall be unlawful for any person in any public place, or at 
any meeting where more than five persons are assemble, to advocate or teach by 
word of mouth or otherwise that men should not enlist in the military or naval 
forces of the United States or the state of Minnesota. It shall be unlawful for any 
person to teach or advocate by any written or printed matter whatsoever, or by 
oral speech, that the citizens of this state should not aid or assist the United States 
in prosecuting or carrying on war with the public enemies of the United States. 
Section 4 defines a citizen to be any person within the confines of the State, and 
declares violations of the act to be gross misdemeanors and punishable by fine 
and imprisonment. l 
The Minnesota legislature enacted the statute on April 20, 1917, prior to the federal 
Selective Service Act, enacted in May 1917, and the federal Espionage Act, enacted in 
lGen. St. Supp. 1917,8521-2 to 8521-5. 
Gilbert v. State of Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920). 
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June 1917. In August 1917, at a public meeting for the Non-partisan League in 
Minnesota, Gilbert delivered a speech that Minnesota officials found to discourage 
military conscription. In his speech Gilbert argued: 
We are going over to Europe to make the world safe for democracy, but I tell you 
we had better make America safe for democracy first. You say, what is the matter 
with our democracy. I tell you what is the matter with it: Have you had anything 
to say as to who should be president? Have you had anything to say as to who 
should be Governor of this state? Have you had anything to say as to whether we 
would go into this war? You know you have not. If this is such a great 
democracy, for Heaven's sake why should we not vote on conscription of men. 
We were stampeded into this war by newspaper rot to pull England's chestnuts 
out of the fire for her. I tell you if they conscripted wealth like they have 
conscripted men, this war would not last over forty-eight hours? 
Due to the fact that the speech was made at a public meeting, Gilbert violated the statute 
for speaking out against enlistment in front of more than five people. Therefore, 
Minnesota police arrested Gilbert for crimes under the Minnesota statute and a jury at 
Minnesota district court level convicted him. The Goodhue county court sentenced 
Gilbert to one year injail, a five hundred dollar fine, and prosecution costs. When 
Gilbert's attorneys, George Nordlin and Frederick Pike, appealed to the Minnesota State 
Supreme Court, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the Goodhue jury 
and the constitutionality of the state statute. 
In an expensive and tedious process that lasted three years, on November 10, 
1920, Gilbert's lawyers managed to appeal Gilbert's conviction to the United States 
Supreme Court. The defense argued that Gilbert's conviction was wrong on two counts. 
They argued first that the Minnesota statute "usurped Congress's authority over the 
2 Ibid., 3. 
81 
military" and second, "that the statute violated the First Amendment.',3 Gilbert's case 
raised the issues of military enlistment, state versus federal power, police power, free 
speech, pacifism, and clear and present danger. After oral arguments, the justices took 
over a month to debate issues and hand down their decision. 
On December 13, 1920 the U.S. Supreme Court delivered its decision. In a vote 
of seven to two, the Supreme Court upheld the Minnesota Supreme Court decision. 
Justice Joseph McKenna and the majority of the Court found that: 
First, the statute did not usurp congressional authority. The statute was a valid 
exercise of the State's police power because it was designed to promote patriotism 
amongst its citizens. Second, the statute did not violate the First Amendment. 
The Court pointed out that freedom of speech was not absolute, stating that it 
would have been a travesty on the constitutional privilege defendant invoked to 
assign him the protection of the First Amendment given the national 
circumstances at the time he made his speech.4 
Justices concurring in the majority decision included Associate Justice Joseph McKenna, 
Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Associate Justice William Day, Associate 
Justice Willis Van Devanter, Associate Justice Mahlon Pitney, Associate Justice James 
McReynolds, and Associate Justice John Clarke. Chief Justice Edward White and 
Associate Justice Louis Brandeis opposed Gilbert's conviction. 
Breaking Down the l'v/ajority Opinion 
Associate Justice McKenna wrote the opinion for the majority. He broke his 
opinion into two parts. First, he discussed the defendant's argument that the Minnesota 
statute overstepped the jurisdiction of the United States Congress and second, he 
3 Ibid., 1. 
4 Ibid. 
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addressed the defendant's contention that the First Amendment protected him in speaking 
out during the war with Germany. To begin, McKenna listed the powers of the United 
States Congress, including, "provide for the common defense and general welfare of the 
United States, declare war, raise and support armies, make rules for the government and 
regulation of the land and naval forces."s Following these Congressional wartime 
privileges, McKenna explained that Gilbert's argument made it seem as though he was 
claiming to be a citizen of the United States. but not a citizen of Minnesota and therefore, 
Gilbert felt that he did not have to follow the legislation of the state. Furthermore, 
Gilbert's contention made it seem as if the states had no relation to the federal United 
States and McKenna clarified both of these points. He wrote, 
Undoubtedly, the United States can declare war and it, not the States, has the 
power to raise and maintain armies. But there are other considerations. The 
United States is composed of the States. the States are constituted of the citizens 
of the United States, who also are citizens of the States, and it is from these 
citizens that armies are raised and wars waged, and whether to victory and its 
benefits, or to defeat and its calamities, the States as well as the United States are 
intimately concerned. And whether to victory or defeat depends upon their 
morale, the spirit and detennination that animates them-whether it is repellent 
and adverse or eager and militant; and to maintain it eager and militant against 
attempts at i<; debasement in aid of the enemies of the United States, is a service 
of patriotism; and from the contention that it encroaches upon or usurps any 
power of Congress, there is an instinctive and immediate revolt. Cold and 
technical reasoning in its minute consideration may indeed insist on a separation 
of the sovereignties and resistance in each to any cooperation from the other, but 
there is opposing demonstration in the fact that this country is one composed of 
many and must on occasions be animated as one and that the constituted and 
constituting sovereignties must have power of cooperation against the enemies of 
all. Of such instance, we think, is the statute of Minnesota and it goes no farther. 6 
A great deal exists in this paragraph to weigh and assess. McKenna made a clear point 
that although the federal and state governments of the United States had separate powers, 
S Ibid., 3. 
6 Ibid., 4. 
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overall their services to the people living in the United States overlapped. For example, 
while the federal Congress had the power to recruit an army, the soldiers came from the 
individual states. And when it came to war, a victory or defeat for the United States 
meant a victory or defeat for each of the states making up the United States. Therefore, 
McKenna and the majority of the Supreme Court argued that the Minnesota state 
government created the statute in order to aid the overall United States war effort by 
evoking patriotism in its citizens. They believed that the statute not only served to 
encourage Minnesota citizens in the defeat of Germany, but also to encourage the entire 
United States in the defeat Germany. They did not find the Minnesota statute to overstep 
the bounds of the United States Congress. Tn fact, they found that the statute offered 
nationalistic support for the war that the United States Congress declared. 
In addition, McKenna cited the 1918 state law precedent State v. Holm, in which 
the Minnesota Supreme Court found that: 
The contention was rejected that the Espionage Law of June 15, 1917, abrogated 
or superseded the statute, the court declaring that the fact that the citizens of the 
State are also citizens of the United States and owe a duty to the Nation, does not 
absolve them from duty to the State nor preclude a State from enforcing such a 
duty.7 
Unlike the Schenck v. United States case, the United States Supreme Court had precedent 
to work from in Gilbert's case. Citing the State v. Holm decision reinforced the majority 
opinion of the Supreme Court that the Minnesota statute did not violate federal authority. 
Instead, they observed the statute to be within the jurisdiction of the Minnesota state 
government. The majority of the Supreme Court found that American citizens belonged 
7 State v. Holm, 139 Minnesota 267 (1918). 
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both to the nation and their individual states and therefore, had to observe dual 
citizenship laid out in the Fourteenth Amendment. For the majority, federalism mattered. 
In conclusion, McKenna and the majority of the Supreme Court found the first 
argument of the defense to be baseless because they argued, "the State is not inhibited 
from making 'the national purposes its own purposes to the extent of exerting its police 
power to prevent its own citizens from obstructing the accomplishments of such 
purposes."'S In this final statement, the majority of the Supreme Court held that all states 
had the authority to enforce "police powers to preserve the peace of the State.,,9 The 
Minnesota statute did not hinder the war effort. In fact, it helped to stifle speech that 
obstructed the United States war effort. As the prosecution contended, the Minnesota 
statute maintained public peace and the jury found that Gilbert disrupted that peace. 
Gilbert made a speech in a public setting in which audience members did not appreciate 
his remarks. According to McKenna the prosecution found that in response to Gilbert's 
speech, "there were protesting interruptions, also accusations and threats against him, 
disorder and intimations ofviolence."lo McKenna contended that Minnesota created the 
statute to handle such instances in which a person evoked violence in public. The 
majority of the Supreme Court confirmed that the Minnesota statute held the proper 
function of keeping people like Gilbert from disrupting the peace and causing violence 
that might lead to injury of others. 
In response to the defense's second argument that the Minnesota statute violated 
the right of free speech, McKenna and the majority of the Supreme Court explained that: 
S Gilbert, 4. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 5. 
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The asserted freedom as guaranteed or secured either by the Constitution of the 
United States or by the constitution of the State, we pass immediately to the 
contention and for the purposes of this case may concede it, that is, concede that 
the asserted freedom is natural and inherent, but it is not absolute, it is subject to 
restriction and limitation. And this we have decided. In Schenck v. United States, 
249 U.S. 47, 52, we distinguished times and occasions and said that "the most 
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire 
. h d· . II mat eatre an causmg a pamc .... 
By 1920, the Supreme Court had decided a number of free speech cases from the World 
War I period in which most of the justices applied the "clear and present danger" 
standard. They pointed to precedent cases, such as Schenck, Frohwerk, Debs, and 
Abrams to confirm that the freedom of speech had some limitations, including situations 
in which the person speaking put other Americans in danger or invoked other Americans 
to violence. 
In the case of Gilbert, the Supreme Court found that his speech created a clear and 
present danger to the citizens of Minnesota and the United States. His speech intended to 
work people into a frenzy and oppose the United States war with Germany. McKenna 
stated, 
Gilbert's speech had the purpose they denounce. The Nation was at war with 
Germany, armies were recruiting, and the speech was the discouragement of 
that-its purpose was necessarily the discouragement of that. It was not an 
advocacy of policies or a censure of actions that a citizen had the right to make. 12 
The majority of the Supreme Court found that since United States Congress declared war 
in defense of the American nation, words against the effort symbolized words against the 
good of the nation. They contended that Gilbert was an educated man who understood 




statements in order to hinder the United States objective in war and cause agitation 
among American citizens. In result, McKenna exclaimed, "[Gilbert] could have no 
purpose other than that of which he was charged. It would be a travesty on the 
constitutional privilege he invokes to assign him its protection." 13 The majority of the 
Court believed that Gilbert knew he was making false statements in order to persuade 
people not to help in the war effort even though it was being fought to protect the nation. 
The Court decided that such lies did not deserve to be protected under the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Of the defense's two arguments, McKenna focused the bulk of his opinion on the 
concern of the Minnesota statute usurping the powers of the United States Congress. He 
addressed the issue of free speech in three short paragraphs. He cited the precedent case 
law and deemed that the "clear and present danger" standard rule made Gilbert's 
argument a mute point. McKenna's opinion gives evidence to the fact that the freedom 
of speech jurisprudence was in its early stages. The majority of the justices did not think 
outside of box on the issue. They based their decisions on prior cases that raised the 
same issues of free speech during the war. 
While the majority vote included seven justices, only six agreed with the reasons 
stated in McKenna's opinion. Following his opinion, Associate Justice Holmes stated 
that he agreed with upholding Gilbert's conviction, but did not agree with the 
interpretation by McKenna and the other five justices in the majority decision. Holmes 
disagreed in large part with the first section of McKenna's opinion on the fact that 
citizens had a duty to state and national government and were accountable to the laws in 
13 Ibid. 
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both domains. Holmes believed that state's rights overpowered national rights in this 
case and therefore, did not concur to the entirety of McKenna's opinion. 14 
Breaking Down the Minority Opinion 
Chief Justice Edward White dissented from the majority opinion because he 
believed that "the subject-matter is within the exclusive legislative power of Congress, 
when exerted, and that the action of Congress has occupied the whole field.,,15 White 
contended that the issue of obstructing enlistment fell under the jurisdiction of the federal 
United States Congress. He believed that the Espionage Act of 1918 took priority over 
any state statute, including the Minnesota statute that the jury convicted Gilbert of 
breaking. In contradiction to Holmes, White believed that national supremacy reigned in 
this case, not states' right. White made no reference to the freedom of speech argument 
in his brief dissent. His main ohjection to Gilbert's conviction was that the state of 
Minnesota should not have had the statute in the first place. He believed the United 
States Congress held exclusive jurisdiction for subjects regarding war and the enlistment 
of troops. 
While also dissenting, Associate Justice Brandeis did not vote against Gilbert's 
conviction for the same reasons as Chief Justice White. Brandeis stated upfront, 
"[Gilbert] claimed seasonably that the statute violated rights guaranteed to him by the 
Federal Constitution. This claim has been denied: and, in my opinion, erroneously.,,16 
Brandeis explained that although the Minnesota statute was technically implemented 
14 Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, 290. 
15 Gilbert, 5. 
16 Ibid., 6. 
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during the war, it was not limited to the war. It was to be maintained after the war as 
well. To this point, Brandeis contended, "Unlike the Federal Espionage Act of June 15, 
1917, c. 30,40 Stat. 217, 219, [the Minnesota statute] applies equally whether the United 
States is at peace or at war. It abridges freedom of speech and of the press, not in a 
particular emergency, in order to avert a clear and present danger, but under all 
circumstances.,,17 In contrast to the majority opinion and White's dissenting opinion, 
Brandeis's minority opinion focused on the freedom of speech issue of the case from the 
start. By comparing the state statute to the Espionage Act, Brandeis demonstrated how 
the Schenck ruling of a "clear and present danger" standard could not be applied in this 
case. He continued stating that the Minnesota statute went beyond the scope of the 
Espionage Act by prohibiting Minnesota citizens from advocating for pacifism. Because 
Minnesota enacted the statute months before Congress passed the United States Selective 
Service Act, Brandeis argued, "The prohibition imposed by the Minnesota statute has no 
relation to existing needs or desires of the Government. It applies although recruiting is 
neither in process nor in contemplation. For the statute aims to prevent not acts but 
beliefs.,,18 He continued explaining that such a statute affected everyone from religious 
preachers to school professors to parents because it prohibited them from speaking their 
beliefs on the subject or advising young men whether or not to join the military. The 
statute prohibited those who had moral or religious convictions about pacifism from 
teaching their beliefs to others. 
In 1920, the judiciary had not yet employed the policy of incorporation, meaning 




Barron v. Baltimore, the defense brought the issue of whether federal rights should be 
applied to the states before the Supreme Court. After both sides of the case made their 
arguments, the Supreme Court decided that the federal Bill of Rights only applied to 
federal action. 19 This decision stood firm for almost a century before the Supreme Court 
reconsidered the idea of incorporation. In the Gilbert case, Justice Brandeis questioned 
Barron stating: 
That such a law [reference to the Minnesota statute] is inconsistent with the 
conceptions of liberty hitherto prevailing seems clear. But it is aid that the guaranty 
against abridging freedom of speech contained in the First Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution applies only to federal action; that the legislation here complained of is 
that of a State; that the validity of the statute has been sustained by its highest court as 
a police measure; that the matter is one of state concern; and that, consequently this 
court cannot interfere. But the matter is not one merely of state concern. The state 
law affects directly the functions of the Federal Government. It affects rights, 
privileges and immunities of one who is a citizen of the United States; and it deprives 
him of an important part of his liberty. These are rights which are guaranteed 
protection by the Federal Constitution; and they are invaded by the statute in 
question.2o 
Brandeis was clear in his conviction that tht: federal Bill of Rights applies to all American 
citizens all the time. He found the prosecution's argument that the state of Minnesota had 
a right to limit citizens' freedoms for the sake of maintaining peace faulty. Brandeis 
contended that state laws affected the functions of the federal government and therefore, 
the federal Constitution needed to be applied. He explained that the power of the United 
States Congress to declare war and make decisions on the enlistment of troops meant that 
only the United States Congress should be enacting laws regarding whether or not 
legislation was necessary in order to maintain national security in times of war. He 
contended: 
19 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 P.S. 243 (1833). 
20 Gilbert, 6. 
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Congress, which has power to raise an army and naval forces by conscription when 
public safety demands, may, to avert a clear and present danger, prohibit interference 
by persuasion with the process of either compulsory or voluntary enlistment. As an 
incident of its power to declare war it may, when the public safety demands, require 
from every citizen full support, and may, to avert a clear and present danger, prohibit 
interference by persuasion with the giving of such support. But Congress might 
conclude that the most effective Army or Navy would be one composed wholly of 
men who had enlisted with full appreciation of the limitations and obligations which 
the service imposes, and in the face of efforts to discourage their doing SO.21 
Brandeis believed that Congress held the sole power in deciding whether freedom of 
speech should be limited to avoid a clear and present danger in times of war. He argued 
that the Congress may decide that freedom of speech is necessary in order to recruit a 
military of soldiers that embrace their war duties, instead of forcing recruitment upon 
those that hold pacifist beliefs. Brandeis highlighted the key point that Minnesota 
enacted the statute months before the federal Espionage and Selective Service Acts, 
which led him to believe that Minnesota had overstepped the federal Congress's war 
powers. 
Brandeis continued his minority opinion by explaining that because the federal 
Congress decided whether or not the United States went to war, it was a federal right of 
all Americans to speak their opinion on the matter. He felt that states did not have a say 
in whether United States citizens supported or rejected a federal policy. He clarified: 
The right of a citizen ofthe United States to take part, for his own or the country's 
benefit, in the making of federal laws and in the conduct of the Government, 
necessarily includes the right to speak or write about them; to endeavor to make his 
own opinion concerning laws existing or contemplated prevail; and, to this end, to 
teach the truth as he sees it. Were this not so 'the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for 
any thing else connected with the powers or duties of the national government' would 
be a right totally without substance.22 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 7. 
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Brandeis argued that because the federal government declared war and later enforced 
conscription, American citizens deserved their federal rights when discussing these 
federal matters. Brandeis found that the national government had supremacy over the 
state governments and therefore, the national government determined what police powers 
the states held. He maintained: 
But the duty of preserving the state governments falls ultimately upon the Federal 
Government. ... And the superior responsibility carries with it the superior right. 
The States act only under the express direction of Congress .... The fact that they 
may stimulate and encourage recruiting ... does not give them the power by police 
regulations or otherwise to exceed the authority expressly granted to them by the 
Federal Government.23 
Therefore, Brandeis determined that the Minnesota statute violated the authority ofthe 
federal government. He found that at that time Minnesota passed the statute, the federal 
government had not yet instituted mandatory conscription. Therefore, American men 
were free to join or not join the United States military as they pleased. Due to this fact, 
Brandeis argued that the Minnesota statute was incompatible with the federal policy 
because at that time the federal government still allowed open talks about government 
decisions in the war against Germany. 
Upon passage of the Espionage Act in June 1917, two months after Minnesota 
enacted its statute, Brandeis explained that the two laws conflicted. He stated: 
The federal act did not prohibit the teaching of any doctrine; it prohibited only certain 
tangible obstructions to the conduct of the existing war with the German Empire 
committed with criminal intent. It was so understood and administered by the 
Department of Justice. Under the Minnesota law, teaching or advice that men should 
not enlist is made punishable although the jury should find (1) that the teaching or 
advocacy proved wholly futile and no obstruction resulted; (2) that there was no 
intent to obstruct; and the court taking judicial notice of facts, should rule (3) that, 
23 Ibid. 
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when the words were written or spoken, the United States was at peace with all the 
world.24 
Brandeis found that the Minnesota statute withheld citizens' rights to discuss their beliefs 
about enlistment and the war, whereas the Espionage Act only prosecuted those who 
spoke words that caused actual detriment to the United States war effort. He argued that 
the degree of difference in these two policies was the difference between maintaining 
homeland security and depriving citizen~ of their constitutional rights. Therefore, he 
resolved that the federal act overruled the state act under the power of national 
supremacy. States did not have the right to enact statutes that fell under the exclusive 
power of the United States Congress. 
In conclusion, Brandeis made one last argument about how the Minnesota statute 
violating the Fourteenth Amendment. He stated: 
As the Minnesota statute is in my opinion invalid because it interferes with federal 
functions and with the right of a citizen of the United States to discuss them, I see no 
occasion to consider whether it violates also the Fourteenth Amendment. But I have 
difficulty in believing that the liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, which has been 
held to protect against state denial the right of an employer to discriminate against a 
workman because he is a member of a trade union, Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 
the right of a business man to conduct a private employment agency, Adams v. 
Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, or to contract outside the state for insurance of his property, 
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589, although the legislature deems it inimical to 
the public welfare, does not include liberty to teach, either in the privacy of the home 
or publicly, the doctrine of pacifism; so long, at least, as Congress has not declared 
that the public safety demands its suppression. I cannot believe that the liberty 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes only liberty to acquire and to 
. 25 
enJoy property. 
This final point in Brandeis's minority opinion set the stage for the case of Gitlow v. New 
York (1925), which the Supreme Court decided on five years later. By including the 
reference to the Fourteenth Amendment Brandeis opened the jurisprudence of the First 
24 Ibid., 8. 
25 Ibid .. 8-9. 
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Amendment to the idea of incorporation. In the Gilbert decision, Brandeis held that the 
Minnesota statute violated Gilbert's freedom of speech protected under the First 
Amendment of the federal Constitution. He argued that the national government's 
authority over war and enlistment overrode the state's policies; but, furthermore, he 
argued that the Fourteenth Amendment applied the national freedom of speech to the 
states and therefore, entitled Gilbert to make his August 18, 1917 speech. Brandeis's 
appeal to the Fourteenth Amendment proved int1uential in the coming years as the 
Supreme Court considered the idea of the federal Bill of Rights being applied to the 
states. As Zechariah Chafee, Jr. explained in his 1941 ret1ection on the Gilbert case, 
Still more significant is the opinion of Justice Brandeis. It may be a dissenting 
opinion, but its importance remains, because this is the first time that any member 
of the Court in any kind of published opinion squarely maintained that freedom of 
speech is protected against state action by the United States Constitution. Not, of 
course, by the original document of 1787, but by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
ratified in 1868 ... Nobody then realized that Gilbert v. Minnesota was the first 
glimmer of the new day which was to dawn with Gitlow v. New York. At that 
time, the Gilbert case was only one more disappointment of the hopes that the 
Supreme Court would protect free speech against encroachment.26 
Brandeis's appeal to incorporation in Gilbert became part of the majority opinion in 
Gitlow v. New York. While still not fully concurring with the rest of the Court in the 
Gitlow case, Brandeis's transformative ideas about free political speech started to show 
up in the language of the majority. As Associate Justice Edward Sanford wrote in his 
majority opinion on the Gitlow case, "For present purposes we may and do assume that 
freedom of speech and of the press - which are protected by the First Amendment from 
abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' 
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by 
26 Chafee, 295-298. 
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the States.,,27 Slowly, but surely, Brandeis affected the jurisprudence of the freedom of 
speech. His dissenting arguments in Abrams and Gilbert proved influential in future 
rulings on First Amendment cases. 
The Sign(ficance of the Ruling on Gilbert v. Minnesota 
The Gilbert case is important to this study because it offered the first opportunity 
for Brandeis to clarify his understanding of the freedom of speech. Unlike McKenna 
who wrote the majority opinion and broke it into two separate addresses on state versus 
federal authority and freedom of speech, Brandeis found that the two defense arguments 
intertwined. At its root, Brandeis contended that the freedom of speech trumped any state 
policy because all American citizens were guaranteed that liberty in the United States 
Constitution. 
Prior to this case, Brandeis did not have the chance to express his sentiments on 
freedom of political speech because in Schenck he had not fully thought through the 
meaning of free political speech and following Abrams, he bowed to the opinion of 
Holmes who was a veteran of the Supreme Court. In Gilbert, Brandeis stood alone in his 
opinion. Even Holmes did not see eye to eye with Brandeis on the importance of 
protecting freedom of speech in this particular case. As Richard Polenberg explained, 
"Oliver Wendell Holmes told Brandeis that he had gone 'too far' in his Gilbert dissent, 
and added, 'I have marked McK.[enns's] Op.[inion] 'Concur in result on the record.",,28 
This dispute is significant among the justices to note because while Brandeis broke from 
the majority with Holmes in Abrams, he pushed ahead in his thinking on the 
27 Gillow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), 9. 
28 Polenberg, 271. 
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jurisprudence of the First Amendment. It would be some time before the majority of the 
Supreme Court started to understand and concur with Brandeis's forward-thinking 
position in the importance and centrality of the freedom of expression in United States 
culture. In the meantime, Brandeis continued to lay the foundation for the modem 
conception of the First Amendment jurisprudence. In the final case of this study, Whitney 
v. Cai!fornia (1927), Brandeis concurred with the rest of the Supreme Court in upholding 
the defendant's conviction; however, his separate opinion demonstrated his distinct 
attitude toward the freedom of speech. 
96 
CHAPTER V 
CONCURRING, YET STANDING APART: 
BRANDEIS'S OPINION ON WHITNEYV. CALIFORNIA 
The Facts, Issues, and Background o/Whitney v. California 
On November 28 1919, California authorities arrested Anita Whitney for crimes 
under the California Criminal Syndicalism Act, enacted on April 30, 1919. Little did 
Whitney know that by 1925, six long years later, her case would have risen to the United 
States Supreme Court. l Whitney v. California is the final case in this study because it 
demonstrates the epitome of Associate Justice Brandeis's influence on the jurisprudence 
of free speech.2 In his judicial opinion, Brandeis expressed eloquently the scope of the 
First Amendment. From breaking away from the majority of the Supreme Court in 
Abrams, to standing alone in Gilbert, Brandeis solidified his understanding of free speech 
in a political democracy in the Whitney case. 
Unlike the previous two cases, Anita Whitney's arrest and conviction took place 
in the post-World War I years. Yet, California legislators enacted the California Criminal 
Syndicalism Act as a direct result of the war. While 1917 marked the year that the 
United States entered the Great War, it also marked the year of the Russian Revolution 
and rise of the Bolshevik Socialist Party in Russia. Unhappy with the high casualty rates, 
1 Haig Bosmajian, Anita Whitney, Louis Brandeis, and the First Amendment (Madison: 
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2010),13. 
2 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
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famine, and unemployment, Russian workers became frustrated with the war conditions 
in late 1916, early 1917. At the same time, the Bolshevik political party rose to power 
under the promise of feeding and employing working people. In March 1917, the 
Russian Revolution took place and Tsar Nicolas II abdicated his throne. Under the 
leadership of Vladimir Lenin, the Bolshevik Party overthrew the Provisional Russian 
government. To fulfill their promises, Lenin and the Bolsheviks pulled Russia out of the 
war in order to focus on resolving domestic problems.3 They preached a system of 
socialism in which all people would share the country's wealth and power. Though the 
idea of socialism had roots reaching back to Karl Marx and earlier scholars, the Russian 
Revolution sparked international awareness of and concern about socialism. 
The Russian Revolution inspired many unsatisfied Americans who did not favor 
the existing Constitutional government and capitalistic economy. Anita Whitney was one 
such American. Following World War I, pockets of communist groups formed 
throughout the United States. Americans identified this phenomenon as the Red Scare. 
The majority of Americans, including state and federal government officials, feared a 
revolution similar to Russia's; therefore, individual state governments took it upon 
themselves to institute policies that made it illegal for citizens to join organizations that 
advocated for revolutionary activity. On April 30, 1919, California enacted its Criminal 
Syndicalism Act, which prohibited California citizens from joining or participating in 
organizations that encouraged an overthrow of the state or federal governments.4 
3 Albert M. Craig, et al., The Heritage of World Civilizations, 8th edition (Upper Saddle 
River: Pearson Education, Inc., 2009). 
4 California Statutes 1919, c. 188, p. 281. 
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In 1919, Whitney joined the Communist Labor Party of California. Born into a 
well-known political family, the California officials monitored Whitney's political 
activity. After attending a national conference held by the Communist Labor Party in 
California, state officials arrested her for participating in an organization that promoted 
radical revolutionary activity to overthrow the current government. A county court 
convicted Whitney of criminal syndicalism. However, Whitney's lawyer, Walter H. 
Pollak, appealed the case, arguing that the Criminal Syndicalism Act violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.5 The District Court of Appeal 
of California upheld the conviction and, in tum, Whitney'S attorney appealed to the 
California Supreme Court, which at first denied the appeal and then after a second 
request to hear the case agreed. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction. In 
1925, the case then made its way to the federal Supreme Court, but the Court rejected it 
claiming they lacked jurisdiction. In 1926, the federal Supreme Court reversed itself and 
allowed the case to be argued. At long last, in 1927, the final ruling on the case came 
down with the entire United States Supreme Court upholding the conviction. Whitney's 
case raised the issues of criminal syndicalism, free speech, assembly, communism, 
industrialization, worker unrest, capitalism, federal versus state legal jurisdiction, 
revolution, terrorism, and imminent threat.6 
In the nine years following the end of World War I, the historical context had 
changed in the United States. The post-war years brought prosperity to the United States. 
Change also took place on the Supreme Court. From Abrams to Gilbert, the Supreme 
Court maintained the same nine members: however, by 1927, the Supreme Court had five 
5 Whitney, 5. 
6 Ibid., 1. 
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new justices. Republican President Warren Harding appointed Republican William 
Howard Taft in 1921, Republican George Sutherland in 1922, Democrat Pierce Butler in 
1923, and Republican Edward Sanford in 1923. Republican President Calvin Coolidge 
appointed Republican Harlan Stone in 1925.7 These cultural and political changes 
unquestionably played a significant role in how the Supreme Court ruled on cases in the 
later 1920s. 
Yet over time, Brandeis's philosophy on free speech hardened. The purpose of 
this chapter is to analyze the differences between the two concurring Supreme Court 
opinions in the Whitney case On May 16, 1927, the Supreme Court ruled nine to zero in 
favor of upholding Whitney's conviction. However, seven justices concurred with 
Associate Justice Sanford's opinion and only Associate Justice Holmes concurred with 
Brandeis's opinion. Understanding the differences between the two opinions makes 
Brandeis's opinion read almost like a dissenting opinion. Brandeis's opinion laid the 
groundwork for the jurisprudence of the freedom of speech that Americans came to 
consider the norm by the early twenty-first century. 
An Analysis of Sanford's Concurring Opinion 
The justices concurring with Associate Justice Sanford's opinion included, Chief 
Justice Taft, Associate Justice Van Devanter, Associate Justice McReynolds, Associate 
Justice Sutherland, Associate Justice Butler, and Associate Justice Stone. Justice Sanford 
7 Kermit L. Hall, ed., The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, 
2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 130-131, 880-881, 990-992, 979-982, 
997-999. 
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started his opinion with a review of the evidence and argument of Whitney's case. He 
explained: 
By a criminal information filed in the Superior Court of Alameda County, 
California, the plaintiff in error was charged, in five counts, with violations of the 
Criminal Syndicalism Act of that State. Statutes, 1919, c. 188, p. 281. She was 
tried, convicted on the first count, and sentenced to imprisonment. The judgment 
was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal. 57 Cal. App. 449. Her petition to 
have the case heard by the Supreme Court was denied. lb. 453. And the case was 
brought here on writ of error which was allowed by the Presiding Justice of the 
Court of Appeal, the highest court of the State in which a decision could be had. 
Jud. Code, §23 7. On the first hearing in this Court, the writ of error was dismissed 
for want of jurisdiction. 269 U.S. 530. Thereafter, a petition for rehearsing was 
granted, lb. 538; and the case was again heard and reargued both as to the 
jurisdiction as the merits.8 
Sanford included this summary in order to show the original conviction handed down by 
the California county court and then to demonstrate how the case had proceeded through 
the Appeal courts, both at the state and national level. He followed this summary with an 
address of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act to identify the provisions that related 
to Anita Whitney's involvement and actions within the Communist Labor Party. Sanford 
deemed two sections of the Act applicable to Whitney's conviction: 
Section 1. The term 'criminal syndicalism' as used in this act is hereby defined as 
any doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and abetting the 
commission of crime, sabotage (which word is hereby defined as meaning willful 
and malicious physical damage or injury to physical property), or unlawful acts of 
force and violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing 
a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political change. 
Section 2. Any person who: ... 4. Organizes or assists in organizing, or is or 
knowingly becomes a member of, any organization, society, group or assemblage 
of persons organized or assembled to advocate, teach or aid and abet criminal 
syndicalism ... is guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment.9 
8 Whitney, 5-6. 
9 Ibid., 6. 
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The first section defined what criminal syndicalism entailed in the state of California. 
The Act specified that one who encouraged or supported violent methods to obtain 
political change was guilty of criminal syndicalism. The second section deemed it a 
crime for a person to become a member of an organization that encouraged or supported 
violent methods for obtaining political change. 
Following his address of the Criminal Syndicalism Act, Sanford explained the 
importance of writ of error. He reinforced that according to division of powers in a 
federal system the United States Supreme Court was not to rule on state cases that did not 
raise a federal question. Sanford pointed out that Whitney's lawyer, Walter Pollak, had 
not raised a federal question originally. Sanford stated: 
Here the record does not show that the defendant raised or that the State court 
considered or decided any Federal question whatever, excepting as appears in an 
order made and entered by the Court of Appeal after it had decided the case and 
the writ of error had issued and he en returned to this Court. IO 
Thus, by law, the Supreme Court denied Whitney's 1925 appeal when her lawyer first 
applied to the federal Court. However, with the addition of questions of the federal 
question, the Supreme Court heard the case the second time around. In the 1926 
arguments, Walter Pollak contended that the California Criminal Syndicalism Act 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Pollak argued: 
10 Ibid. 
II Ibid. 
The question whether the California Criminal Syndicalism Act ... and its 
application in this case is repl!gnant to the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the lTnited States, providing that no state shall 
deprive any person oflife, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw, and 
that all persons shall be accorded the equal protection of the laws, was considered 




Sanford and the majority of the Supreme Court critiqued the fact that Whitney's lawyer 
did not raise this federal question earlier. but accepted the petition to the case. Sanford 
cited a number of precedents that lacked federal questions from the beginning, but were 
accepted by the United States Supreme Court. Nevertheless, Sanford made it clear that 
the Supreme Court did favor the late petition and only accepted the case because of the 
precedent cases. He clarified, "So - while the unusual course here taken to show that 
federal questions were raised and decided below is not to be commended - we shall give 
effect to the order of the Court of Appeals as would be done if the statement had been 
made in the opinion of that court when delivered.,,12 The confusion surrounding whether 
Whitney's writ of error fit into the federal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court weighed 
heavily on the justices in their ultimate decision. Nonetheless, Sanford wrote that in 
1926, the Supreme Court accepted Whitney's case, but limited their analysis to the 
question of the constitutionality of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act in regard to 
the Fourteenth Amendment. They did not extend the scope of the case beyond this 
question because the justices already had enough doubt about whether the federal 
question was posed in the appeal process in the first place. 
After detailing the background information about how Anita Whitney's case 
reached the Supreme Court, Sanford dove into the evidence of the case. First he 
explained that undisputed evidence showed that Anita Whitney belonged to the local 
branch of the Socialist Party in Alameda County, California. When the national Socialist 
Party of America split between "radicals" and "old-wing Socialists," the Alameda branch 
12 Ibid. 
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sided with the radical sect. 13 In order to separate itself from the old-wing, the radicals re-
named themselves the Communist Labor Party of America and created a new 
constitution. Sanford explained: 
In its 'Platform and Program' the Party declared that it was in full harmony with 
'the revolutionary working class parties of all countries' and adhered to the 
principles of Communism laid down in the Manifesto of the Third International at 
Moscow, ahd that its purpose was 'to create a unified revolutionary working class 
movement in America,' organizing the workers as a class, in a revolutionary class 
struggle to conquer the capitalistic state, for the overthrow of capitalist rule, the 
conquest of political power and the establishment of a working class government, 
the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. in place of the state machinery ofthe capitalist, 
which should make and enforce the laws, reorganize society on the basis of 
Communism and bring about the Communist Commonwealth - advocated, as the 
most important means of capturing state power, the action of the masses, 
proceeding from the shops and factories, the use of the political machinery of the 
capitalist state being only secondary; the organization of the workers into 
"revolutionary industrial unions"; propaganda pointing out their revolutionary 
nature and possibilities; and great industrial battles showing the value of the strike 
as a political weapon - commended the propaganda and example of the Industrial 
Workers of the World and their struggles and sacrifices in the class war .... 14 
In this long-winded sentence, Sanford detailed the mission statement of the newly formed 
Communist Labor Party that Whitney's local branch joined. The national organization 
adopted the policies of the Russian Communist Labor Party, which advocated for a 
working class revolution in America in order to overthrow the capitalist government in 
place. The Communist Labor Party made it no secret that they supported the use of 
revolutionary behavior. Sanford pointed out that Anita Whitney became active in the 
Communist Labor Party by serving as a delegate at the national convention in November, 
1919. She worked on the Credentials and Resolutions Committees at the conference and 
she helped to draft a proposal for the Party's political action. Sanford explained that she 
played a large role in creating a proposal that recommended the following: 
13 Ibid., 7. 
14 Ibid. 
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The c.L.P. of California fully recognizes the value of political action as a means 
of spreading communist propaganda .... The C.L.P. of California proclaims and 
insists that the capture of political power, locally or nationally by the 
revolutionary working class can be of tremendous assistance to the workers in 
their struggle for emancipation. Therefore, we again urge the workers who are 
possessed of the right of franchise to cast their votes for the party which 
represents their immediate and final interest - the C.L.p.IS 
Whitney's proposal promoted political change through the election process. It advocated 
for legal means of replacing the current government with Communist Labor Party 
members. In the defense argument, Whitney even claimed to have read this proposal in 
front of the convention, demonstrating her support of it. The Supreme Court accepted 
that she helped to design and promote the lawful proposal; however, Sanford explained 
that the National Convention of the Communist Labor Party rejected her plan and 
adopted the National Constitution of Moscow that promoted violence and terrorism to 
institute communist changes. 
Sanford and the majority of the justices argued that while Whitney did not create 
or promote the newly adopted Constitution of the Communist Labor Party, her continued 
membership and involvement at the National Convention demonstrated her support of it. 
Sanford rejected Whitney's argument that "the character of the state organization could 
not be forecast when she attended the convention" because "[Whitney] not only remained 
in the convention, without protest, until its close, but subsequently manifested her 
acquiescence by attending as an alternate member of the State Executive Committee and 
continuing as a member of the Communist Labor Party.,,16 According to these facts, 
Sanford found the Alameda County Court and the California District Court of Appeals to 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 8. 
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be correct in their conviction of Whitney for being an active member of an organization 
that promoted political revolution, which violated the California Criminal Syndicalism 
Act. Sanford also noted that the defense's argument on the basis of this evidence did not 
involve a federal question and, therefore, did not fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court. He rejected that this review of evidence had any relation to the question 
of constitutionality. 17 
In his second point, Sanford analyzed the defense's argument that the Criminal 
Syndicalism Act lacked clarity and meaning and therefore violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process clause. Sanford contended that this argument was baseless 
because the California Criminal Syndicalism Act defined the term "criminal 
syndicalism.,,18 Sanford named several cases in which the question of due process did 
apply because of "vagueness and uncertainty" in the definition of state statutes, but he 
claimed that California Criminal Syndicalism Act did not come close to those precedent 
cases.




The Act, plainly, meets the essential requirement of due process that a penal 
statute be "sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it, what conduct 
on their part will render them liable to its penalties," and be couched in terms that 
are not "so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning and differ as to its application ... This statute presents no greater 
uncertainty or difficulty, in application to necessarily varying facts, than has been 
repeatedly sanctioned by this court. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377; 
Miller v. Strahl, 239 U.S. 426, 434." So, as applied here, the Syndicalism Act 
required of the defendant no "prophetic" understanding of its meaning.2o 
20 Ibid., 8-9. 
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Sanford found that the California legislature used sound, defining language in the 
construction of the Criminal Syndicalism Act to allow California citizens to understand 
its meaning. He even pointed out that the Supreme Court had ruled that Criminal 
Syndicalism acts from other states with less clear language had been deemed acceptable, 
so California's statute definitely did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's due process 
clause in this argument. 
Third, Sanford analyzed the defense's argument that the Syndicalism Act violated 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment based on: 
The ground that, as [the Syndicalism Act's] penalties are confined to those who 
advocate a resort to violent and unlawful methods as a means of changing 
industrial and political conditions, it arhitrarily discriminates between such 
persons and those who may advocate a resort to these methods as a means of 
maintaining such conditions.21 
The defense contended that the Communist Labor Party should be allowed to use violent 
means to promote their communist political beliefs just as they claimed the current 
capitalistic leaders of the United States used violence to maintain their power and 
policies. Sanford responded to this argument by stating: 
It is settled by repeated decisions of this Court that the equal protection clause 
does not take from a State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but 
admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion, and avoids what is done only 
when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary; and that 
one who assails the classification must carry the burden of showing that it does 
not rest upon any reasonable basis to these methods as a means of maintaining 
h d· . 22 sue con ItlOns. 
Sanford contended that the state legislatures had the power to create statutes aimed at 
prohibiting possible threats to the safety of its citizens. He said it would be impossible to 
21 Ibid., 9. 
22 Ibid. 
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think of every possible evil that could injure a citizen, but that state legislatures had to do 
their best to institute police powers that best protected their citizens. Furthermore, he 
argued that the California Criminal Syndicalism Act was not limited to the Communist 
Labor Party, he explained that "The Syndicalism Act is not class legislation; it affects all 
alike, no matter what their business associations or callings, who come within its terms 
and do the things prohibited.,,23 Sanford found that the Act applied to all California 
citizens, no matter their economic statues or job title, who violated its terms. 
Furthermore, he legitimated the California Act on the basis that a number of other states 
had adopted similar Criminal Syndicalism Acts. 
Finally, in his fourth point, Sanford addressed the defense's argument that the 
Syndicalism Act violated the due process of the Fourteenth Amendment in protecting a 
citizen's right to "speech, assembly, and association.,,24 Sanford found that in prior 
precedents, including Gillow v. New York, the Supreme Court decided that: 
The freedom of speech which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an 
absolute right to speak, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an 
unrestricted and unbridled license giving immunity for every possible use of 
language and preventing the punishment of those who abuse this freedom; and 
that a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this 
freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite to crime, 
disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government 
and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means, is not open to question.25 
According to precedent rule, Sanford and the majority of the Supreme Court found that 
they needed to observe the same standard in Whitney's case. Sanford contended that 






danger to other citizens. He also emphasized that states had the right to limit free speech 
by police force when they felt the speech threatened the good of the state's citizens. In 
Whitney's case, the Court found her membership in an organization that advocated for 
criminal activity to secure their political objectives to provide substantial evidence that 
her freedom of speech needed to be limited for the safety of other California citizens. 
In conclusion, Sanford and the majority of the Supreme Court found that the 
defense's arguments that the California Criminal Syndicalism Act violated the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment were unconvincing. 
Therefore, they ruled to uphold the conviction by the Court of Appeals. Sanford's 
opinion was direct and concise. He provided the background, evidence, and arguments of 
Whitney's case and then rejected the defense's line of reasoning in four succinct points. 
He applied precedent case law in all points made and confirmed the conviction of the 
State courts. 
An Analysis of Brandeis's Concurring Opinion 
While supporting Whitney's conviction, Associate Justice Brandeis did not agree 
with the reasoning given in Associate Justice Sanford's opinion. Brandeis upheld Anita 
Whitney's conviction because he believed her case did not fall within the jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court. Indeed, he believed that Whitney's lawyers failed to raise a 
constitutional question from the beginning. Yet, outside of the question of jurisdiction, 
the rest of Brandeis's opinion read like a dissent. In an articulate manner in dicta, 
Brandeis expressed his deep beliefs about the scope of free political speech. His opinion 
in Whitney's case demonstrated how far he had come in his analysis of free speech from 
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the time of Schenck v. United States in 1919. The following breakdown of Brandeis's 
opinion demonstrates how he approached Whitney's case and left behind a legacy of free 
political speech jurisprudence for the future. 
Brandeis started his opinion with a summary of Whitney's arrest, conviction, and 
appeal. He stated: 
Miss Whitney was convicted of the felony of assisting in organizing, in the year 
1919, the Communist Labor Party of California, of being a member of it, and of 
assembling with it. These acts are held to constitute a crime, because the party 
was formed to teach criminal syndicalism. The statute which made these acts a 
crime restricted the right of free speech and of assembly theretofore existing. The 
claim is that the statute, as applied, denied to Miss Whitney the liberty guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 26 
Brandeis valued the facts and made sure to huild his arguments on evidential proof. His 
language was direct and simple because he wanted readers to understand the reasoning 
behind his stance. Upon laying the evidence of the case out for readers, Brandeis 
demonstrated his discontent with the California Criminal Syndicalism Act. He argued: 
The felony which the statute created is a crime very unlike the old felony of 
conspiracy or the old misdemeanor of unlawful assembly. The mere act of 
assisting in forming a society for teaching syndicalism, of becoming a member of 
it, or of assembling with others for that purpose is given the dynamic quality of 
crime. There is guilt although the society may not contemplate immediate 
promulgation of the doctrine. Thus the accused is to be punished, not for 
contempt, incitement or conspiracy, but for a step in preparation, which, if it 
threatens the public order at all, does so only remotely. The novelty in the 
prohibition introduced is that the statute aims, not a the practice of criminal 
syndicalism, nor even directly at the preaching of it, but at association with those 
h h · 27 W 0 propose to preac It. 
Brandeis made it a point to show how the California Criminal Syndicalism Act broke 
from precedent laws because it did not convict people of teaching criminal syndicalism, 
26 Ibid., 10. 
27 Ibid. 
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but it convicted those who even contemplated teaching criminal syndicalism. Brandeis 
found the California statute to be unconstitutional because it went outside the bounds of 
an imminent threat. Imminent threat rested at the heart of his opinion. Brandeis argued 
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected the fundamental 
rights of free speech and assembly, but yet he acknowledged that these rights were "not 
in their nature absolute.,,28 He explained: 
Their exercise [referring to fundamental rights of free speech and assembly] is 
subject to restriction, if the particular restriction proposed is required in order to 
protect the State from destruction or from serious injury, political, economic or 
moral. That the necessity which is essential to a valid restriction does not exist 
unless speech would produce, or is intended to produce, a clear and imminent 
danger of some substantive evil which the State constitutionally may seek to 
prevent has been settled.29 
Basing this case law on the "clear and present danger" standard of Schenck v. United 
States, Brandeis modified the ruling by changing the word "present" to "imminent." In 
doing so, he hoped to clarify the Schenck standard. He agreed that free speech and 
assembly needed to be limited when danger loomed in the face of these fundamental 
rights. The impending threat of violence or injury to other United States citizens 
overpowered a person's right to speak or assemble with others. However, he contended 
that when an imminent threat was not present, the First Amendment protected all 
Americans in their right to speak freely and assemble with others in a political 
democracy. 
Following this line of reasoning, Brandeis made it clear that state legislatures had 
every right to enact legislation restricting organizations from preaching criminal 





stipulated that the state legislatures could only enact such legislation if they felt a strong 
possibility of imminent threat in their state. Brandeis found that the lack of clarity on this 
issue, both at the state and federal level, stemmed from the fact that the "clear and present 
danger" standard of Schenck v. United States was not defined. He wrote: 
This Court has not yet fixed the standard by which to determine when a danger 
shall be deemed clear; how remote the danger may be and yet be deemed present; 
and what degree of evil shall be deemed sufficiently substantial to justify resort to 
abridgement of free speech and assembly as the means ofprotection.3o 
Brandeis found this to be a grave problem. Without defining the "clear and present 
danger" standard, justices had no definite grounds on which to convict those accused of 
overstepping their First Amendment rights. 
To show his concerns about the jurisprudence of fundamental freedoms, Brandeis 
harkened back to the American Revolution and the Founding Fathers who created the 
American Constitution, in order to demonstrate the historical significance of protecting 
American freedoms. He eloquently wrote: 
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to 
make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the 
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as 
an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and 
courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you 
will and speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread 
of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be 
futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against 
the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an 
inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a 
fundamental principle of the American government. 31 
In these powerful statements, Brandeis reminded readers of the fundamental values that 
underlay the United States He argued that the Founding Fathers of the United States 




regarded free speech and assembly as the means by which citizens could make their 
opinions and concerns known. Without these freedoms, Americans would be deprived of 
the rights that made the American Revolution possible in the first place. He contended 
that free speech and assembly were part of being an active citizen. Most importantly, he 
noted that the American government was responsible for ensuring these liberties. 
Brandeis provided support for his philosophy about the Founding Fathers by 
quoting Thomas Jefferson's first Inaugural Address in which Jefferson stated, "If there be 
any among us who would wish to dissolve this union or change its republican form, let 
them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be 
tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.,,32 Jefferson advocated for freedom of 
speech because he felt that debates allowed people to explain the reasoning behind their 
conflicting beliefs. Without free speech, people would not be able to comprehend or 
empathize. with dissimilar viewpoints. Brandeis followed this reference by explaining 




They knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its 
infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that 
fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable 
government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely 
supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil 
counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public 
discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law - the argument of force in its 
worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of goveming majorities, they 




Brandeis included this reference to the Founders in order to address both state and federal 
legislation that limited the fundamental rights of American citizens. He argued that 
having statutes that threatened punishment for speaking about certain topics would cause 
people to fear speaking at all. In tum, he believed that stifled speech would cause 
resentment for state and federal governments and that the silence of American citizens 
would imply a tyrannical rule of all governments over its citizens. Later civil libertarians 
labeled this fear a "chilling effect" on political speech. 
Brandeis contended that fear of danger or harm that might come of free speech 
was not enough for state and federal governments to limit the fundamental rights of free 
speech and assembly of American citizens. In his now famous quote, he stated, "Men 
feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to free men from the 
bondage of irrational fears.,,34 Brandeis made the point that irrational fears, such as 
witches in the Middle Ages, resulted in the punishment and death of many innocent 
women who did not have the ability to defend themselves. Brandeis argued that free 
speech allows people to confront their fears and gain understanding of other peoples' 
perspectives. He explained that the only circumstance in which free speech should be 
limited is when a threat is clear and imminent. He stated, "To justify suppression of free 
speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech 
is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is 
imminent.,,35 Seeking to define the "clear and present danger" of Schenck, Brandeis used 





specified that the government only had the power to suppress speech if there was a 
forthcoming threat to other American citizens. He wrote: 
But even advocacy of violation, however, reprehensible morally, is not a 
justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement 
and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on. 
The wide difference between advocacy and incitement, between preparation and 
attempt, between assembling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind. In order to 
support a finding of clear and present danger it must be shown either that 
immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past 
conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated.36 
Brandeis argued that a ditIerence existed between protected free speech and speech that 
needed to be suppressed for advocating immediate injury to others. 
Once again Brandeis used this opportunity to reflect back on the Founders of the 
United States. He stated: 
Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not 
fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty ... Only an 
emergency can justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be 
reconciled 'Nith freedom. Such in my opinion, is the command of the 
Constitution. It is therefore always open to Americans to challenge a law 
abridging free speech and assembly by showing that there was no emergency 
justifying it. 37 
According to the power of judicial review developed in Marbury v. Madison (1803), 
Brandeis acknowledged that his role on the Supreme Court was to interpret the 
Constitution according to how the framers intended it to be understood. He argued that if 
the Founders rallied behind the shift from a British monarchy to a republic, then they 
would oppose the stifling of conflicting political beliefs at any point in time. Quoting 




willing to allow it to men whose opinions seem to you wrong or even dangerous.,,38 
Chafee's writings on freedom of speech int1uenced Associate Justices Brandeis and 
Holmes. Brandeis included the reference to Chafee in order to demonstrate that free 
speech opened the door to conflicting opinions and that was the beauty of protecting it in 
the United States. 
Brandeis wrote that state and federal governments were only entitled to restrict 
free speech in cases of emergency. In cases when free speech or assembly created an 
emergency situation, the Constitution no longer protected a person's fundamental rights 
because he or she put others in danger. However, the degree of harm needed to be 
significant for government to step in. Brandeis contended that state police measures on 
free speech and assembly are unconstitutional if no serious threat can be identified. The 
possibility or chance that injury could ensue from free speech was not enough to justify 
suppression. A real and severe threat was necessary to uphold any state or federal law 
that restricted an American's right of free speech and assembly. 
After spending the majority of his opinion defining the "clear and present danger" 
standard, in his last three paragraphs, Brandeis addressed the California Criminal 
Syndicalism Act. While dissenting from Sanford's opinion in his discussion of free 
speech, Brandeis explained why he concurred with upholding Whitney's conviction in 
these last three paragraphs of his opinion. He referred to section four of the Syndicalism 
Act to support his concurrence. Section four included the following statement: 
38 Ibid. 
Inasmuch as this act concerns and is necessary to the immediate preservation of 
the public peace and safety, for the reason that at the present time large numbers 
of persons are going from place to place in this state advocating, teaching and 
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practicing criminal syndicalism, this act shall take effect upon approval by the 
Governor.39 
In his analysis of this statement, Brandeis found that it fit within the jurisdiction of 
California's state constitution, but not the federal United States Constitution. He wrote 
that California's state legislature had the power to enact such a statute in the case of 
emergency, in this case the considerable number of people promoting criminal 
syndicalism throughout the state. On the other hand, he argued that Whitney's lawyers 
failed to make the case relevant to the federal Constitution because they did not raise the 
questions pertaining to the federal constitutionality of Whitney's arrest and conviction 
from the beginning. He explained: 
Whenever the fundamental rights of free speech and assembly are alleged to have 
been invaded, it must remain open to a defendant to present the issue whether 
there actually did exist at the time a clear danger; whether the danger, if any, was 
imminent; and whether the evil apprehended was one so substantial as to justify 
the stringent restriction interposed by the legislature. The legislative declaration, 
like the fact that the statute was passed and was sustained by the highest court of 
the State, creates merely a rebuttable presumption that these conditions have been 
satisfied.4o 
Brandeis contended that it rested on the defense to raise the question of constitutionality 
regarding a person's speech. Building on the first half of his opinion, Brandeis said that 
it was the duty of the defendant to argue that their speech was not a clear and imminent 
threat to the public. In Whitney's case, he acknowledged that the defense made the 
argument that the California Criminal Syndicalism Act violated the federal Constitution; 
however, they did not provide evidence to show that Anita Whitney's speech and 





advocated for the protection of free speech, he found a clear and imminent threat in 
Whitney's speech and activity within the Communist Labor Party. He stated: 
In the present case, however, there was other testimony which tended to establish 
the existence of a conspiracy, on the part of members of the International Workers 
of the World, to commit present serious crimes; and likewise to show that such a 
conspiracy would be furthered by the activity of the society of which Miss 
Whitney was a member.41 
In conclusion, Brandeis found that the confusion over whether the Supreme Court 
had the authority to rule on Whitney's case plus the serious threat shown in the language 
of the organization that Whitney was a member of, proved that Whitney's conviction by 
the California state courts needed to be upheld. Associate Justice Holmes joined 
Brandeis in this concurring opinion. 
The Significance of Brandeis's Opinion in Tflhitney v. California 
After examining Sanford and Brandeis's concurring opinions, it is clear that they 
held different reasons for upholding the California court's conviction. After throwing out 
the question of writ of error, Sanford focused his opinion on debunking the defense's 
argument that the California Criminal Syndicalism Act violated the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. On the other hand, Brandeis used this 
opportunity to clarify the meaning behind the "clear and present danger" standard rule. 
Just as in his Gilbert opinion, Brandeis focused his attention on the question of free 
speech in Whitney's case. 
While Brandeis decided to uphold the conviction because defense failed to 
provide a sound argument for the unconstitutionality of the California Act, his opinion 
41 Ibid. 
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left a legacy as one of the most notable defenses of free speech in a political democracy. 
By modifying the "clear and present danger" to a "clear and imminent" or "serious 
emergency" standard, he provided future Supreme Court justices with a better rule to 
guide their future decisions. Furthermore, his reflection on the Founders reached a large 
audience because it reminded United States citizens about the liberties that the United 
States built itself upon. His opinion broadened the scope of civil liberties consciousness 
and sparked new discussions about the meaning of free political speech among lawyers, 
scholars, and government officials. 
From his dissent with Holmes in Abrams, to his individual dissent in Gilbert, 
Brandeis solidified his beliefs on free speech in the Whitney case. In fact, Brandeis had 
already written his opinion on free speech for Charles Ruthenberg's case in March 1927, 
but Ruthenberg died before the Supreme Court handed down its decision, so the case was 
thrown out. Therefore, Brandeis was waiting for a case like Whitney's in order to share 
his beliefs on the jurisprudence of free speech. Though disappointed that his opinion fell 
into a concurring vote, Brandeis used the Whitney case to publish his interpretations 
about what the framers really meant by freedom of expression in the First Amendment. 
Historian Mark Tushnet reinforced the impact of Brandeis opinion in the Whitney 
case in his work, I Dissent: Great Opposing Opinions in Landmark Supreme Court 
Cases. Tushnet stated: 
Some scholars view Justice Brandeis's opinion as the greatest "dissent" in the 
Supreme Court Reports. It is celebrated for two main reasons. First, it develops a 
legal doctrine identifying the scope of the protection the First Amendment affords 
expression, and that doctrine eventually became the law ... The second, and 
perhaps more important, reason for why Justice Brandeis's opinion endures is its 
powerful rhetoric. Justice Brandeis was rarely eloquent. He had made his 
reputation as a man of facts and details, not of words so powerful that they 
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captured the imagination ... Justice Brandeis set out an account of democracy 
and self-government that cannot fail to move the reader.42 
Brandeis's opinion not only provided language for future Supreme Court justices to draw 
upon in free speech cases, but also provided American citizens with a defense against 
limits on their political speech. By proving that their speech did not create an imminent 
threat, American citizens who held contradictory opinions about politics and society had 
a better form of protection from state and federal limitations on speech and assembly. 
Brandeis's opinion in Whitney v. California proved to be his most influential role in 
shaping the eventual jurisprudence of the freedom of speech in the United States. 
42 Mark Tushnet, ed., I Diss'ent.' Great Opposing Opinions in Landmark Supreme Court 
Cases (Boston: Beacon Press, 2008), 98-99. 
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CONCLUSION 
BRANDEIS'S LEGACY ON FREE SPEECH 
Change defined the Progressive and World War I eras of the United States. 
Social, cultural, industrial, political, intellectual, and legal reforms dominated the period. 
Many influential Americans led the progressive movement that culminated in World War 
I. Louis D. Brandeis was one such progressive who played a vital role in the reformation 
of free speech at this time. However, just as the Progressive Era proved to have many 
complexities regarding who was involved and what issues they stood for, Brandeis was a 
complex progressive. While advocating for more government involvement in protecting 
workers from employers, Brandeis advocated for greater protections from big 
government in the free speech cases. Brandeis was not a straight-laced progressive. In 
his various roles as a lawyer, reformer, Zionist leader, and jurist, Brandeis acted and ruled 
according to how he interpreted the evidence in each situation. Over his time on the 
Supreme Court, Brandeis educated himself on the meaning of free political speech and 
dramatically shifted his stance from Schenck to Whitney. There is no black and white 
understanding of Brandeis or his evolution in ruling on free speech. Nevertheless, 
Brandeis had a powerful effect on the United States during his lifetime; his lasting legacy 
shaped the jurisprudence of free political speech. 
Brandeis's opinions in the Abrams, Gilbert, and Whitney decisions demonstrate 
the transformation and solidification of his convictions about how the framers intended 
the United States Constitution to protect political speech. It is important to understand 
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the limited civil liberties consciousness in the United States leading into World War I. 
For this reason, the Supreme Court lacked precedent to base their decision-making upon 
free speech cases that arose out of the environment of World War I. Alongside Associate 
Justice Holmes, Brandeis contributed to forming and defining the language used to 
decide free speech cases. Brandeis sought to understand the substance of the First 
Amendment of the Constitution and in his findings he determined that the Founders of 
the United States valued the freedom of speech. As a result, Brandeis used the power of 
judicial review to uphold what he found to be the fundamental meaning of free speech 
under the 1787 United States Constitution and the 1791 federal Bill of Rights. 
While each branch of the federal government plays a role in interpreting the 
Constitution, Supreme Court justices have the unique condition of life term in office. 
Although the justices are not immune from political allegiances, the life term allows for a 
certain degree of freedom in their decision-making. The question of how much power 
each federal branch has over constitutional interpretation is a topic for a different study. 
The significance here is that all Supreme Court opinions, both majority and minority, are 
saved and used as precedent for future cases. Despite the fact that Brandeis's opinions 
were not always part of the majority, the Supreme Court kept his writings on file and in 
later years used his arguments to overturn earlier decisions on free political speech. On 
the Supreme Court, Brandeis exercised law to create an environment for dissent and 
political dialogue. 
Although Brandeis valued the right of free speech, he examined each case 
individually. While dissenting in Gilbert, Brandeis concurred with upholding the 
conviction in Whitney. He did not ignore the evidence of the case in order to fight his 
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battle for the protection of free speech. He crafted his opinions to incorporate a running 
judicial discussion of the protection of free speech. 
From 1919 to 1927, Brandeis helped to develop the scope of the First 
Amendment. The more cases that raised the question of free speech, the more Brandeis 
thought through the matter. A few months later, explaining the discrepancy between his 
judgment in Schenck versus his judgment in Abrams, Brandeis admitted that he had not 
fully thought through the meaning of protecting free speech under the First Amendment 
of the United States Constitution. Coming out of the historical context of World War I, 
the Supreme Court found Associate Justice Holmes's standard of the "clear and present" 
danger to satisfy the conviction of a Socialist Party leader printing pamphlets that 
opposed the war. However, both Holmes and Brandeis continued their research on free 
speech over the following summer and found that the "clear and present" standard lacked 
sufficient definition and, therefore, threatened the Founder's intent regarding political 
speech. 
In Abrams, Holmes and Brandeis demonstrated their reformulated interpretations 
of the First Amendment, specifically the right of free speech. Writing the minority 
opinion, Holmes introduced the "imminent threat" standard. He and Brandeis argued that 
although the defendants spoke out against the American efforts in Russia, they did not 
incite an imminent threat to the American public. The Abrams case created the 
"imminent threat" standard, which Holmes and Brandeis solidified in the coming years. 
Their dissent in Abrams demonstrated how Holmes and Brandeis had taken time to 
reflect on the "clear and present" standard of free speech and rework the judicial rule for 
weighing speech rights against valid internal security concerns. They feared that the 
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"clear and present" standard could be used to create unforeseen limitations of free speech 
by all levels of government and, therefore, they sought to clarify the meaning of the 
standard. It was significant that Holmes wrote the opinions in both of these cases 
because it showed that he wanted to amend the "clear and present" standard that he 
himself had created. 
The question of Brandeis's personal orientation to the defendants in the Abrams 
case is a point of interest. Brandeis's parents emigrated from Eastern Europe and 
identified themselves as Jews, which related to the Russian Jewish backgrounds of the 
defendants in the case. Therefore, one might argue that this connection weighed on 
Brandeis's ruling in the case. And this may have been true. However, more research 
needs to be done on this question. In the present study, the fact that the other cases did 
not involve immigrants demonstrates that Brandeis did not rest his case completely on the 
Jewish immigrant backgrounds. in deciding whether or not the Constitution protected a 
person's free speech. 
After 1920, Brandeis found himself alone in his mission to protect political 
speech. In the Gilbert case, Brandeis wrote a dissenting opinion that gathered no support 
from the other Supreme Court justices. In his opinion he argued that the "due process" 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied the First Amendment, including the speech 
clause, to and against the states. Brandeis contended that free political speech was a 
fundamental right of citizens that the states did not have the power to limit through their 
state statutes. He found the fact that Minnesota enacted its statute prior to the United 
States Congress enacting the Selective Service Act and Espionage Act to be an issue of 
state versus federal power. He contended that the Minnesota government had 
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overstepped the federal power of Congress to enforce laws regarding the war and war 
policy. In this argument, Brandeis defended national supremacy over state power. His 
argument demonstrated the beginnings of a shift from state to federal power over the 
course of the twentieth century. Brandeis's opinion raised the issue of "selective 
incorporation" to a limited audience of legal scholars and jurists, which, in tum, 
eventually led to the 1925 incorporation of the First Amendment in Gitlow v. New York. 
While most of Brandeis' s legacy on the jurisprudence of free speech came after his death, 
the incorporation standard proved the significance of his work within his lifetime. 
In the final case of this study, Whitney v. California (1927), Brandeis produced 
his most eloquent and powerful opinion. Building on Holmes's Abrams "imminent 
threat," Brandeis provided a full explanation of why the "clear and present" standard 
needed to be reworked and defined. Drawing on the power of judicial review, Brandeis 
included large passages referring to the Founding Fathers and what they meant by speech 
freedoms in the First Amendment. He argued that the United States was founded on 
political dissent from the tyrannical British rule and therefore, the Founders promoted 
open discussions in order to avoid the return of tyrannical government at any level. 
Brandeis explained that limits could only be placed on an American's freedom of 
political speech ifhis or her speech incited an imminent and serious evil that would cause 
injury to other American citizens. He clarified that even the possibility of a threat was 
not enough to stifle political speech because Americans had the fundamental right to 
express opposing and even dangerous ideas. Only imminent danger to others provided 
federal and state governments the power to step in and suppress a person's political 
speech. 
125 
Brandeis concurred in the conviction of Anita Whitney because of the question of 
whether the case fell within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or not, and the fact that 
the Communist Labor Party did, in fact, incite an imminent threat to the American public. 
However, his defense of free speech created the argument and language that later 
Supreme Court justices used to overturn "clear and present danger" and adopt the 
"imminent threat" standard. Over forty years after Brandeis and Holmes handed down 
their opinion in Whitney, the Supreme Court instituted their modified standard in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969). Although neither Holmes nor Brandeis lived to hear the 
Supreme Court decision for Brandenhurg, they understood in their lifetime the 
importance oflaying the foundation for free speech jurisprudence. Brandeis's earnest 
defense of free speech in the 1920s created the traction for the Supreme Court to start 
grappling with the Founding Fathers' true intent for the First Amendment. The Supreme 
Court decisions in Gitlow and Brandenburg drew upon Brandeis's language and line of 
reasoning. The legal standards of incorporation and imminent threat demonstrate that 
Brandeis played the key role in the shaping of the jurisprudence for the freedom of 
speech. 
By including the opposing opinions in each of the cases examined in this study, it 
is possible to see both the limited attention to civil liberties consciousness and Brandeis's 
role in making free speech a topic of national concern. In all three cases, the justices who 
wrote the opposing opinions to Brandeis spent limited time addressing the freedom of 
speech. Following Schenck, the majority of justices referred to the "clear and present" 
precedent as the rule of the Court and went no further in their consideration of the scope 
of free speech. Brandeis did. He struggled to define the nature, rule, and substance of 
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the freedom of speech and he argued for strict protection of what he considered to be a 
fundamental right of all American citizens. His persistent defense of the freedom of 
political speech widened the limited civil liberties consciousness in the United States. 
Tangentially and although the civil rights movement did not take off until the 
1950s and 1960s, Brandeis established the groundwork for the civil rights movement 
through his advocacy of free speech in the 1920s. The transformation of his thoughts on 
free speech over the course of the three cases discussed in this work demonstrated his 
increasing resolve about the importance of protecting the freedom of political speech of 
minorities in the United States. Americans living in the Progressive Era witnessed many 
reforms, but Brandeis's striving for the legal reiorm of the freedom of speech proved to 
be one of the most significant legacies of that time period. The dialogue he initiated 
about the breadth and limits of free political speech in his Supreme Court opinions has 
challenged every succeeding generation of Americans. 
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